


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


STRATEGIC DEFENSE:  
SHOULD THE AIR FORCE  
CHANGE ITS DOCTRINE?

THESIS

Lois J. Schloz, Captain, USAF

AFIT/GLM/LSM/91S-55



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
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STRATEGIC DEFENSE:  
SHOULD THE AIR FORCE CHANGE ITS DOCTRINE?

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Logistics  
of the Air Force Institute of Technology  
Air University  
In Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Science in Logistics Management

Lois J. Schloz, B.A.  
Captain, USAF

September 1991

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

## Preface

The purpose of this study was to determine if it is time to update Air Force strategic defense doctrine. As reforms occur throughout the Eastern Bloc, the intuitive answer is yes. However, this study set out to prove change is in order, and to determine the new doctrine.

I used the method of Contextual Content Analysis, a staple of the Social Sciences. Through the use of the Minnesota Contextual Content Analysis (MCCA) program, I was able to show a correlation between documented past doctrinal changes and the Context scores generated by MCCA. The correlation, however, was not enough to allow determination of the new doctrine. This work should be continued, and models built to assist our future leadership in the determination of doctrine and strategy.

During my research, I received a great deal of assistance and support from others. I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Lieutenant Commander Donald McNeeley, for making this a fun project as well as an educational one. He remained enthusiastic about the project from beginning to end. The thesis would not have been possible at all without the help of Professor Don McTavish at the University of Minnesota. His assistance, and his software program, MCCA, rendered invaluable data. Finally, I would like to thank my best friend and mentor, Major Tony Phillips, for always taking time to be the voice of reason.

Lois J. Schloz

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Abstract

This study set out to determine if the United States Air Force strategic defense doctrine requires changing. The researcher applied contextual content analysis to selected foreign policy statements taken from Presidential State of the Union addresses to determine if past doctrine and strategy changes were evidenced by the context and emphasis scores generated by the Minnesota Contextual Content Analysis (MCCA) software package used for this study. Use of the student's t-test showed differences in mean scores between years with no strategy or doctrinal changes and those in which such changes are documented. These differences in means indicate changes in attitude, which strongly affect doctrine and strategy determination. After showing that these changes in scores related to documented changes in doctrine and strategy, the researcher looked at the scores from 1990 to determine if a change is once again in order. The scores for the year 1990 do indeed demonstrate a need to change the doctrine and strategy. The correlation in scores cannot, however, determine the specific changes that must be made.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE:  
SHOULD THE AIR FORCE CHANGE ITS DOCTRINE?

Chapter I. Introduction

Overview

This chapter discusses some of the striking changes that occurred throughout the Eastern Bloc in 1989 and 1990. It introduces the possible need for the United States to review the present doctrine and strategy pertaining to strategic defense. Following this is an explanation of the investigative questions to be used in the research process, and a delineation of the scope and limitations of the research.

Background

Late in 1989, dramatic political and military changes swept through the Eastern Bloc. The reforms in the USSR were so striking, that Premier Mikhail Gorbachev is seen in a different light by many citizens. It was, after all, Gorbachev who introduced the concepts of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) to the Soviet Union, clearly leading the way to a less overbearing government and the possibility of moving toward democracy. Gorbachev seemed to be loosening the Soviet hold on the republics.

The changes throughout the Eastern Bloc are many and varied. As early as 1988, the world sensed a change when the Soviet Union withdrew "from its foolish intervention in Afghanistan and... offered the United States extraordinary concession in disarmament" (8:7). Poland freely elected a Prime Minister who not only is non-communist, but Catholic as well. An exiled dissident, Andrey Sakharov, was released from exile and elected a member of Soviet Parliament. The Soviet Union unilaterally withdrew six tank divisions from Eastern Europe (24:135). Finally, in October of 1990, the Berlin Wall officially fell, reuniting the two Germanies once again.

Since Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Gorbachev has announced to the world that the Soviet system is a failure; Poland and Hungary are steaming ahead toward a "bourgeois democracy," and capitalism seems to be springing up all over the Third World (16:26). Also of note is the Communist Party's Central Committee decision to scrap Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution. This article "guaranteeing the party 'legal' monopoly of power" (13:133) prevented any semblance of a democratic society. This step was nothing short of revolutionary and led to Gorbachev's planned multi-party elections, which would eliminate the criticism that Soviet voters have no "possibilities of choice" (20:7). In his 1988 article, Brian Morton quoted Polish historian Adam Michnik: "Police rule is being replaced by politics, while

a political dialogue is really getting the upper hand over repression" (22:236).

Such sweeping reforms, considered together with the outcry for democracy and freedom throughout the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, seem to point to a new Soviet Union which no longer deserves former United States President Reagan's nickname the "Evil Empire." If changes continue in this direction, the Eastern Bloc will soon be allies of the US, as it appeared to be during the Persian Gulf Crisis known as "Desert Storm." Should this occur, it becomes necessary for the United States to review its current doctrine and strategy pertaining to strategic defense. Perhaps the current policy of aiming the nuclear arsenal at Eastern Bloc countries is no longer an appropriate stance.

Are these revolutionary changes genuine? Or is the Soviet Union embarking on yet another devious plan to overthrow the free world?

War to the hilt between communism and capitalism is inevitable. Today, of course, we are not strong enough to attack. Our time will come in thirty to forty years. To win, we shall need the element of surprise. The western world will have to be put to sleep. So we shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movement on record. There shall be electrifying overtures and unheard of concessions. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will rejoice to cooperate in their own destruction. They will leap at another chance to be friends. As soon as their guard is down, we shall smash them with our clenched fist (18:1930).

This is a declaration by Dimitry Mannilski, professor at the Lenin School of Political Warfare in Moscow, given in

1930. This professor inspired Premiere Gorbachev's senior class thesis in college. This could lead to the question: Is the "Sleeping Bear" just hibernating? For the purpose of this thesis, however, the researcher assumes that the Soviet Union is sincere in its desire to reform and become an ally of the West.

### Problem Statement

In light of the dramatic political and military changes which occurred in 1989 and 1990, is it time for the United States to review its doctrine and strategy in relation to strategic defense against the Eastern Bloc? The current situation of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) may no longer be appropriate or socially defensible should the Soviet Union become allied with the Western World.

The questions that must be answered are these: In light of the political and military reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, should the USAF change its doctrine and its stance on strategic defense? If the answer is yes, what should be the new strategy and doctrine?

### Investigative Questions

In order to determine the need to update USAF doctrine and strategy, four questions must be answered:

1. What are "doctrine" and "strategy"?
2. What are the current doctrine and strategic defense strategy of the USAF?
3. Does the current policy fit the current situation?

4. Should USAF doctrine and strategy be updated? If so, what should be the new position?

The answers to these questions will lead to further understanding of the concepts of "doctrine" and "strategy," which can be described and defined in terms of USAF manuals and regulations on these topics. In addition, the questions will lead the reader to an understanding of the current doctrine and strategy of the USAF. This doctrine and strategy will be interpreted and explained using the same manuals and regulations used to define the concepts. The evolution of the current doctrine will be a historical review of world politics based on Presidential State of the Union Addresses at the time of development, and a description of the process through which development occurred. Whether the current policy is congruent with today's world situation will be answered by use of the same process used to develop the current strategy. Should the researcher find incongruencies between the strategy and situation of today, a new strategy will be recommended.


This new strategy will be determined by a logical flow from perceived threat through both the official and unofficial chain of policy making in the United States Department of Defense. (Figure 1.) In addition to this logical flow, the model used to determine the current policy also will be used.

### Scope

The scope is limited to Western reactions to political and military changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For the purpose of this document, the West is defined as the United States, Britain, and Germany, and, to a lesser degree, other NATO members in 1990. The researcher considers only USAF doctrine and strategy in relation to these areas. Research will not apply to Third World countries nor other branches of the US military. Also omitted are economic, education and other aspects. The researcher will focus on USAF policy and doctrine in an effort to ascertain whether the current USAF policy on "strategic deterrence" matches the current political situation in Eastern Europe and the USSR. The method of developing strategy and doctrine will be reviewed, to include such inputs as unofficial advisors to the US President and the moral standards of the US people.

### Summary

A short background on the political and military changes occurring in 1989 and 1990 was covered. The chapter listed some examples of these changes, such as Soviet Premiere Gorbachev telling the world that the Soviet System is a failure. The study will focus around four investigative questions that will ascertain the meaning of some key terms as well as explain the development of current doctrine and strategy. The last two questions will help



**Figure 1 Doctrine and Strategy Development**



determine whether the current situation is congruent with the policy, and if the USAF must update its doctrine and strategy pertaining to strategic defense against Eastern Bloc countries. The scope of the research was narrowed to those reactions of the Western world to the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and limited to potential changes in USAF doctrine and strategy.

## Chapter II. Literature Review

### Overview

This chapter reviews possible political and military reactions to changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which occurred in 1989 and 1990. The scope of the research was limited to the reactions of the Western world to military and political changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Reactions of the Third World countries were not reviewed, nor were the economic and other changes which occurred in the same time period. The literature revealed some examples of changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and possible reactions to these changes. The reactions of political and military figures worldwide ranged from a hard-line "Russia is still an enemy" standpoint to a "let's embrace the Russians as brothers" point of view. Following this review is an explanation of content analysis, the method used to help predict strategic doctrine.

After Soviet President Gorbachev introduced the concepts of glasnost and perestroika to the Soviet Union, striking changes began to happen. The Soviet armed forces were pulled out of Afghanistan, and there was a unilateral withdrawal of six Soviet tank divisions from Eastern Europe. In October of 1990, the Berlin Wall officially fell with the reuniting East and West Germany shortly thereafter. Gorbachev planned multi-party elections, a revolutionary idea in the Communist-controlled Soviet Union. Now it is up

to the Western world to determine the correct response to these sweeping changes. At a time when it appears the United States is to be allied with the Soviets once again, the reactions of the West are important to the future of the world.

### Alternative Reactions

The "Hard Line" Approach. Some experts believe the West must maintain its present posture in order to enhance changes going on in the world. Sam Nunn, US Senator from Georgia, stated that NATO's first challenge is to develop an appropriate strategy in response to these changes (24:135). He went on to state that "caution and flexibility, along with some thoughtful contingency planning, are certainly in order" (24:136).

Senator Nunn likened the West's reaction to a stop light, red meaning to say "no," yellow to "move ahead cautiously" and green "press forward with vigor" (24:136). He said we should give a red light to the denuclearization of Europe and asserted that nuclear deterrence will remain "indispensable to NATO security" far into the future (24:137). He also stated that the United States must continue to support NATO's nuclear deterrence as they have since the alliance formed.

Senator Nunn is not the only expert to believe in the continued use of nuclear deterrence. In his article on arms control, Dave Griffiths quoted Micheal L. Moodie, senior

fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Moodie asserted NATO would have to call in nuclear forces "within days of a Soviet attack" (12:125) because of NATO's questionable ability to sustain a conventional conflict due to ammunition shortages.

Other experts are equally cautious. Raymond Garthoff quotes Secretary Frank Carlucci in a speech given in 1988:

Regardless of Gorbachev's stated intentions, Soviet military capability continues to grow, and US policy decisions must be made in light of these growing capabilities. Intentions can change overnight. ... We must ensure that we continue fielding forces capable of deterring aggression at all levels (10:193).

This outlook is prevalent in the Department of Defense. In a White Paper published by the Air Force in June of 1990, the National Security Strategy of the United States states that deterring nuclear attack "will remain the first priority" (6:2). The paper goes on to say that we can "neither adopt the unrealistic assumption that nothing has changed, nor the historically naive presumption that everything has changed" (6:3).

This attitude is not limited to American experts. Time's Henry Mueller and Karsten Prazer interviewed Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany. Herr Kohl stated he foresees further reduction of East-West confrontation, but sees a continued need for soldiers and weapons. He opposed a disarmament policy that treats "announcements as deeds," (23:36) and believes a country must get something in exchange for its concessions.

At the other end of the spectrum were those experts willing to accept these changes at face value and make dramatic changes in the policy of the West.

The "No Nukes" Approach. Many experts lauded an improved conventional capability, but believe nuclear weapons can be reduced dramatically, or even done away with completely. Robert Art begins his article with these words: "The cold war is over and the United States won it" (1:5).

Examples of this attitude abound. In his article "Rethinking Defense," James Kitfield quoted Senator John McCain, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (15:5):

Any fool can see that the threat of war on the plains of Central Europe has diminished dramatically, while the threat from the so called "Third World" has grown. That means we need a reassessment of our commitments and threats, and our military's roles and missions.

Jan van Houwelingen, Netherlands' defense minister, told delegates to a Western European Union meeting on armament research and development that Western nations must provide a better conventional defense when budget and the public perception of threat is declining (3:56). Because of the current perception of the Soviet threat -- the public believes there is no threat -- pressure is placed on NATO forces to reduce defense spending. Link this with the diminishing credibility of NATO's nuclear superiority (3:56) and the result is a cry for multilateral nuclear disarmament.

Along these same lines, Jeane Kirkpatrick said of the dramatic changes in the world "If completed, they will liberate the United States and Western Europe from the constraints of the sustained global military preparedness imposed by the cold war" (14:4). According to Kirkpatrick, neither the United States nor Europe would accept an American military presence outside the NATO framework (14:11). Even Mikhail Gorbachev believes real nuclear disarmament is near (11:130).

Although his reasoning is different, Richard Gardner comes to a similar conclusion. In his lengthy article on what he calls "practical internationalism" he stated our nation has a growing concern to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as a vested interest in preventing nuclear terrorism (9:831).

John Morrocco sees things very pragmatically. He believes the biggest stumbling block to arms control is agreeing on specific measures for verification purposes (21:44). He quotes Maj. Gen. John Fairfield (USAF): "Of all the things the Secretary of Defense is looking at now during the budget reduction process, arms control is receiving tremendous support" (21:45). For John Morrocco, it seems the decision to disarm has already been made.

The review of the literature revealed possible reactions to the sweeping changes happening in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. There was little agreement on

specifics, but the general reactions ranged from a very soft, liberal view to a conservative approach. Many Western experts believe these sweeping changes in Eastern Europe and Russia will withstand difficulty and continue to flourish. They see these changes as ongoing, and as the beginning of the end of Communism as it has been known in the past. These same experts believe it is time, in light of these changes, to head toward total, multilateral nuclear disarmament. Other experts seem to believe that these changes are a Soviet plot to lure the West into lowering its defenses, and that continued nuclear deterrence is a must.

With the changes going on in the Eastern Bloc, the environment in which doctrine and strategy are determined also changes. As will be seen ahead in this chapter, doctrine and strategy are evolutionary, and are often updated due to changes in the world situation. It is important for doctrine to be viable and timely; the changes related in the literature review seem to point to the need to update current doctrine and strategy. Before proceeding, it is important that reader and researcher reach a mutual understanding of various definitions. The reader must also be able to follow the logic of the research project. An explanation of this logic is contained in the following sections.

## Definitions

Doctrine is usually defined as something taught as the principles or creed of a religion or political party (28:402). "It is for policy to lay down the aims to be achieved by strategy, and policy is governed basically by the philosophy which we wish to see prevail" (2:50). This philosophy can be interpreted as doctrine. It is easy to see, then, that an agreed-upon definition is imperative before continuing the discussion at hand. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 defines doctrine in this way: "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application" (7:61). As can be seen in Figure 1, doctrine is the umbrella under which strategy and policy are found. It is the overall principle on which strategy and policy are based.

There must also be an mutual understanding of the term strategy. Webster defines the term as "the science of planning and directing large-scale military operations" (28:1324). "... The aim of strategy is to fulfill the objectives laid down by policy, making the best use of the resources available" (2:3). Beaufre continues: "strategic thinking... is a mental process, at once abstract and rational, which must be capable of synthesizing both psychological and material data" (2:29). For the purposes



of this thesis, however, "strategy" will be defined as it is in AFM 1-1:

... the art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat (7:65).

It should be clear then to the reader that strategy is based upon doctrine. As Beaufre has noted:

Below the level of policy... there is of course the complete pyramid of different levels of strategy; at the top is total strategy which coordinates the various overall strategies peculiar to each field; they in turn coordinate the operational strategies within the field concerned (2:134).

Doctrine and strategy often are updated because of changes in the world. Before the beginning of World War II, America's doctrine was one of isolationism. Our leadership firmly believed that the US should not interfere in the policies and problems of the world. Once Britain was embroiled in war with Nazi Germany, however, US doctrine and policy were changed to meet the dual needs of building up America's defensive capability and of arming Britain. Do not forget, either, that the US and the Soviet Union were actually allies during World War II. As these examples illustrate, doctrine and strategy are evolving entities that are updated and changed as necessary.

At the urging of the US in the 1960s, NATO adopted the strategy of flexible response. This strategy was believed by the US to best meet the Soviet threat. Flexible response

calls for graduated deterrents based on initial conventional defense if attacked, limited nuclear response as necessary, and escalation to general nuclear war if necessary (10:190). In other words, this strategy gave the US and NATO the flexibility to start with intratheater conventional defense, and escalate the type of defense used based on the offensive strategy used by the Soviets. With the increasing arms race between the US and the Soviet Union, however, general nuclear war came to be known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD is the current basis for deterrence theory. Garthoff quotes Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger: "We seek not only to deter actual aggression but also to prevent coercion of the United States, its allies, and friends through the threat of aggression" (10:193). The doctrine, then, is deterrence, and the strategy is flexible response, the climax of which is MAD. Both the doctrine and strategy were developed based on the elements shown in Figure 1, which comprise the "attitude" of the US toward the Soviet Union.

This attitude is reflected by the President of the United States when he sets policy and determines doctrine. He does not, however do this in a vacuum. He bases his decisions upon information given him by such experts as the secretary of defense, the chairman of the JCS, and the service secretaries. Each of these individuals react to other experts' inputs based on the perceived military threat facing the US. The president also considers such aspects as

the state of the nation, the world, the political environment, and budgetary constraints. Additionally there are unofficial advisors and close confidants such as the president's spouse and other family members who also influence his policy development. (See Figure 1).

The morals and attitudes of the public must also be considered by the President when determining policy. In a democracy, the needs and the desires of the governed are represented by the leadership lest the leadership be prevented from obtaining re-election. The people of the United States readily make their views heard on many controversial subjects.

"In a democracy even the matter of national security must come before the people... The position of the United States on nuclear weapons will be made in the town hall and in the think tank" (29:3). The people seem to have a fear of nuclear war, and are quite vocal in expressing this fear.

The fear of nuclear war -- the most intelligent feeling of our time -- has once again taken the form of a mass movement, with men, women, and children demanding not to be incinerated. The demand is moral, but it is also quite general (29:2).

The attitude of the American public is reflected by the President of the United States. Several sources were considered as a means to measure the attitude of the US toward the Soviet Union. Contemporary articles from sources such as Foreign Affairs, The New Republic, and Public Opinion Quarterly were reviewed, but these reports on policy were subject to the interpretation by the author of

each article. In other words, there was a chance that these documents would reveal the attitude of each author, not that of the US. It was imperative to measure the attitude of the US toward the USSR.

Nearly every year, the President gives a State of the Union address to the Congress and the American people in which he states his doctrine and philosophy for dealing with the world. For this reason, State of the Union addresses given to Congress by the President were chosen as the means by which to determine the attitude of the US. The President of the United States speaks for all of America when he speaks, and State of the Union addresses touch on many subjects, including foreign policy and international relations.

At the beginning of the cold war, the Soviet Union was viewed by the public and the government as the principle threat to US national security. Based on the changes which have occurred in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, this no longer appears to be the case. It would appear, then, that State of the Union messages would be the ideal source for determination of the thrust of US policy toward the Soviet Union.

#### Method of Investigation

One way to ascertain the President's concepts of doctrine and strategy is through an analysis of State of the Union addresses. Because the President takes into account

all the elements in Figure 1, and because he elucidates the resulting doctrine in his State of the Union addresses, these addresses should adequately portray the attitude and doctrine of the United States toward the USSR.

### Definition

Content analysis is a research technique used "for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics within text" (Stone et al 1966:5). Content analysis "forces us to be very conscious about just what we are looking for, and why we are looking for it" (4:6). The method involves two important processes: specification of characteristics which shall be measured and application of a set of rules for identifying and categorizing these characteristics (Stone et al 1966:7). Simply stated, content analysis is a method used to compare and analyze written text in as unbiased a manner as possible. This process will be applied to selected State of the Union addresses to determine two important answers: is there a connection between doctrine and State of the Union addresses, and can this connection be used to predict when doctrinal changes become necessary?

### Process

The process of content analysis involves two important steps: deciding which characteristics will be measured, and application of a set of rules for identifying and categorizing these characteristics. This application of

rules is known as classification. This thesis added an important third step: that of statistical analysis of the content analysis results.

Controversy can arise over the method used to classify words. "To make valid inferences from the text (being studied) it is important that the classification procedure be reliable in the sense of being consistent" (27:12). If humans perform this step, a certain amount of subjectivity and fatigue may skew the results. This thesis used a computer to perform the important task of classification.

Classification by computer... leads to perfect coder reliability (if one assumes valid computer programs and well-functioning computer hardware). Once correctly defined for the computer, the coding rules are always applied in the same way (27:15).

### Strengths and Weaknesses

Compared with other analysis techniques, content analysis has several advantages (27:10):

1. Communication is a central aspect of social interaction. Content analytic procedures operate directly on text or transcripts of human communications.
2. The best content-analytic studies use both qualitative and quantitative operations of texts. Thus content analysis methods combine what are usually thought to be antithetical modes of analysis.
3. Documents of various kinds exist over long periods of time. Culture indicators generated from such series of documents constitute reliable data that may span even centuries.
4. In more recent times, when reliable data of other kinds exist, culture indicators can be used to assess quantitatively the relationships among economic, social, and cultural change.

5. Compared with techniques such as interview, content analysis usually yields unobtrusive measures in which neither the sender nor the receiver of the message is aware that it is being analyzed. Hence, there is little danger that the act of measurement itself will act as a force for change that confounds the data.

One weakness that can be attributed to the method is the decision on the portion of text used to perform the analysis. Large portions of text can be difficult to code, as they tend to contain more information and a great diversity in topics (27:16). To overcome this problem, only words and phrases pertaining to foreign affairs were used in this analysis.

Another weakness of content analysis is the question of reliability, in particular stability and reproducibility. Stability is measured by consistency of text coding by the same coder. Again, use of a computer ensured stability. Reproducibility is the extent to which different coders classify text in the same manner. Use of a computer and an established dictionary helped ensure reproducibility (27:17).

Yet another concern is validity. "To assert a category or variable... is valid is to assert that there is a correspondence between the category and the abstract concept that it represents" (27:18). Validity is ensured in this study through the use of an established software package.

### Assumptions

This thesis made several assumptions of which the reader must be aware. As Weber suggested, the computer software and hardware were considered valid and in working order. Words and phrases from the complete text related to foreign affairs were used for analysis, under the assumption that this method results in the most accurate classification of text.

### Applications


Iowa State University's Carl Roberts quotes Bernard Berelson as saying the categories of study for which the use of content analysis is appropriate as investigation of "the characteristics of communication content, the causes of content, and the consequences of content" (26:168).

Examples of these were given as the characteristics of propaganda techniques, psychological states of persons or groups as the cause of communication, and attitudinal and behavioral consequences of communication.

Deborah Welch Larson's study of the origins of the cold war belief systems is an excellent example of the use of content analysis. Larson set out to find when and why US beliefs about the Soviet Union changed so dramatically from 1944 to 1947. The findings of her study clearly show that a President's beliefs, as well as the political environment, affect policy making.



The content analysis study showed that Truman's beliefs about the Soviet Union wavered until after the collapse of the Greek government during the communist-led war. In addition, threatened congressional budget cuts forced him to change his policy toward the Soviets in March 1947 in his "Truman Doctrine" speech. Forced by these events, Truman chose to interpret Soviet policy in such a way as to legitimize containment policies. Several months after this speech, he believed that the Soviets would extend the iron curtain to Western Europe, that negotiation with the Soviets was fruitless, that the Soviets did not keep their agreements, and that the Russians only understood the "language of force." (17:244). Larson depicted the relationships as shown below:



**Figure 2 Adapted from Larson**

Larson's study was based upon content analysis of historical documents, used to determine the timing and direction of change in US policymakers' beliefs about the Soviet Union. Larson concluded that similar methods could be

applied to other topics in international relations (17:253). Based on this study, content analysis was chosen as the method of study for this thesis.

### Summary

This chapter reviewed alternative Western reactions to the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This included the opinions of many western experts in the field of foreign relations. This was followed by definitions and explanations of key terms used in this thesis. A brief explanation of how policy and doctrine are determined was given, followed by an explanation of how data sets were determined and an outline of content analysis, the method used for this thesis.

### Chapter III. Methodology

#### Overview

This chapter explains the manner in which the sample documents for analysis were chosen and describes the Minnesota Contextual Content Analysis (MCCA), the content analysis software package used for this thesis. Following this is a summary of the stages of computer aided content analysis and an explanation of the statistical methods used for this study.

#### Research Design

In order to discover the origins of the current US doctrine and strategy via content analysis, it was necessary to evaluate documents that adequately and accurately represented the "attitude" of the US toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and any changes in this attitude. As was made clear in the previous chapter, Figure 1 depicts the factors leading to doctrine and strategy development. Armed with this knowledge, the researcher began a literature search that would take all these factors into consideration.

The researcher considered several potential sources from which to measure the attitude of the US toward the Soviet Union. Contemporary articles from such sources as The New Republic and Foreign Affairs were rejected because of the potential for interpretation of policy by the author of each article. State of the Union addresses given to Congress by the President touch on many subjects, including

foreign policy and international relations. For this reason, State of the Union addresses were chosen as the source from which to measure the attitude of the US toward the Soviet Union.

As explained in the previous chapter, many factors are considered during doctrine and strategy determination. Presidential State of the Union addresses are the forum for explaining doctrinal stances to the US public. These speeches are written and delivered in such a manner as to be inoffensive; this reflects consideration of the morals and attitudes of the public. The President does not unilaterally determine the doctrine he will relate in his speeches; consideration of budgetary constraints and threat analysis are clearly part of his planning, and the results of his planning are reflected in his State of the Union addresses. The elements shown in Figure 1 are therefore included in doctrine and policy determination as well as in his State of the Union addresses.

State of the Union addresses from 1934 to 1990 were chosen for this thesis. There was no State of the Union address given in 1989. The President's Inauguration speech touched on such areas as foreign policy and foreign affairs, so it was deemed a suitable substitution for a State of the Union address. This time frame was selected to show changes in doctrine, beginning with isolationism, and continuing through history.

In researching the various doctrinal stances the US has taken since 1934, it became evident that changes occurred in both doctrine and overall strategy. Table 1 is a representation of the three doctrines and the respective overall strategies from 1944 to present, adapted from Wieseltier (29).

Table 1 Timeline of Doctrine/Strategy

YEARS	DOCTRINE	STRATEGY
1944 - 1970	USE	MASSIVE RETALIATION (1951) FLEXIBLE RESPONSE (1953) M.A.D. (1967)
1970 - 1984	DETERRENCE	ARMS CONTROL (1971) DETENTE (1974) COLLECTIVE SECURITY (1979)
1984 - PRESENT	DEFENSE	STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (1984)

The "Use" doctrine was in effect from approximately 1944 to 1970. This doctrine called for the actual use of nuclear weapons in case of need. During this timeframe, the US did indeed use nuclear weapons against Japan. Next the US adopted the doctrine of Deterrence; arms control talks with the Soviets were paramount, and were based upon the Mutually Assured Destruction strategy of 1967. The US believed that both the Soviet Union and the US held a large enough nuclear arsenal to prevent each side from launching a first strike. In 1984, President Reagan introduced the doctrine of Defense, in the guise of the so-called Star-Wars initiative. The US had come to believe that defense against a nuclear attack was possible.

The research plan consisted of Contextual Content Analysis of selected foreign policy statements from Presidential State of the Union addresses, coupled with appropriate statistical analysis of the output data, as needed. Once the research design was planned, it was necessary to find a proper medium for the research. The search for a content analysis software package began.

### Software

There are several content analysis software packages available. One program, TEXTPACK runs on microcomputers, workstations, minicomputers, and mainframes with a FORTRAN compiler. The General Inquirer III system, based partially on Ole Holsti's work in the 1960s, is able to classify and analyze text by looking up each word in a content analysis dictionary. It is designed for IBM MVS and VM systems. The Oxford Concordance Program (OCP) is available for mainframe and IBM PCs and compatibles (27:80).

Each of these software packages has its own strengths and weaknesses, which will not be discussed here, as none of these programs were used. Availability and cost constraints as well as validity and reliability concerns were the major factors in choosing software. These packages were either unavailable or beyond financial constraints.

After reading the work of McTavish and Pirro on contextual content analysis, the researcher contacted Professor McTavish at the University of Minnesota. McTavish

and Pirro had written the software package used in their study, and the Minnesota Contextual Content Analysis (MCCA) package was available for use on the University mainframe computer.

The Minnesota Contextual Content Analysis (MCCA) program provides the user with four sets of "anchor points" that allow the user to compare frequencies of meanings expressed within the current social context to frequencies previously found in other contexts. Deviations from these anchor points may be used to identify peculiarities in the data at hand (26:150).

MCCA can be used to examine patterns of emphasized ideas in text and the social context or perspective reflected in the text. Social contexts are analyzed relative to four dimensions: traditional, practical, emotional, and analytic. These are quantified as "C-scores" or Context scores generated by the software (19:245). These context dimensions are further explained in the following section.

### Stages and Process

The first stage in computer aided content analysis is selecting the meaning categories, or dictionary, to be used.

The marriage of dictionaries with content analysis software provides a fast and convenient means of counting manifest expressions of words that fall into the meaning categories set out in one's dictionary (26:149).

The dictionary used in MCCA is oriented toward frequently used words whose meanings are organized into categories. These categories are "of general social science interest and are mutually exclusive" (19:246).

The second stage is the application of statistical techniques to the data, often involving analysis of frequencies favoring factor and cluster analysis. Occasionally, this statistical analysis is restricted to that which accompany the content analysis software used (26:149). Because frequencies provide, by themselves, an accurate rendering of the salient issues or themes within texts (26:153), the statistical package in MCCA was used for this thesis, as well as the standard t-test.

MCCA generates two quantitative scores -- C-scores or context scores, and E-scores or emphasis scores. C-scores help determine the context of a piece of text. Each of four possible contexts incorporates a general idea of societal activity and is a framework in which specific concepts emerge (19:251):

- (a) Traditional Context. A normative perspective on the social situation predominates and the situation is defined in terms of standards, rules and codes which guide social behavior.
- (b) Practical Context. A pragmatic perspective of the social situation predominates and behavior is directed toward the rational achievement of goals.
- (c) Emotional Context. An effective perspective predominates and the situation is defined in terms of expressions of emotion (both positive and negative), and maximizing individual involvement, personal concern and comfort.



(d) Analytic Context. An intellectual perspective predominates and the situation is defined in objective terms.

"Conceptual category tallies are percentaged for each text by the total words in the text. This score is subtracted from an expected score obtained from a norm to yield an emphasis score for each of the concepts" in the dictionary (19:252). This results in the E-score.

E-scores are computed for 117 idea/word categories, the 117th being the "left over" list of uncategorized words. E-scores are the basic measure used for conceptual analysis. The pattern of connectedness of various ideas is examined with a clustering routine. Both similarity and distinction between texts in terms of emphasized patterns of ideas can also be quantified. The distance between texts can be measured as a difference between texts' profile of relative use of the 117 categories. The conceptual differences shown in this proximity matrix can be examined with the use of clustering and other statistical methods (19:253).

Differences in C-scores between texts can be computed and used to express the proximity of texts to each other in terms of their approach to the ideas discussed in the texts. Cluster analysis also helps display the structure of this proximity matrix (19:253). Obviously, there was preparation required before the content analysis could be performed.

Selected foreign policy statements from the texts were transcribed verbatim into machine readable computer files.

"Use of verbatim text is critical because it contains the pattern information central to contextual/conceptual analysis" (19:252). The files were then processed using MCCA. The results are discussed in the following chapter. The researcher feels confident there will be a correlation between E-scores and specific US doctrines and strategies. Should this prove to be the case, it will be a simple matter to view the current E-score based on the State of the Union addresses given by President Bush, and define an appropriate strategy.

For example, if E-scores and specific doctrines and strategies are correlated, there should be a range of scores which will prove to be unique to each doctrine and strategy. If, for instance, E-scores range from 1.0 to 5.0 during the period of Use doctrine, and only then, that doctrine would be applicable any time in future the E-scores again entered that range.

#### Statistical Review

Changes in scores occurring in conjunction with documented changes in doctrine and strategy may not be evident without the use of statistics. Because of the small sample sizes, a t-test was used to show any differences between means of the scores. First, the data was broken down and grouped by year, each group beginning with the year a documented change in doctrine took place, and ending with the year prior to a change, i.e. 1945 - 1969 was included in

one group. (See Table 1). The mean scores from each grouping were compared to one another using the standard t-test.

Changes in attitude often precede changes in behavior, and this pattern should also occur during doctrine and strategy development. For this reason, scores from the year of documented doctrine change were compared to the averaged scores of the previous three years. For example, there was a documented change in doctrine in 1945. The E-scores from 1942, 1943, and 1944 were averaged together, and the standard deviation from these three years was calculated. The standard t-test was then computed, comparing these averages to the E-score from 1945. E-scores and C-scores were averaged and evaluated independent of one another.

### Summary

This chapter described the process used to determine which text should be used for content analysis in this thesis. For various reasons, specific Presidential State of the Union addresses were chosen as the basis of this research. Several software packages were described, and a description of MCCA was outlined. C-scores and E-scores were defined and described, and a brief depiction of the transcription of files and the processing was profiled. Finally, an explanation of the statistical methods used to compare scores was given. The following chapter contains an

analysis of the data and presents conclusions based on that analysis.

## Chapter IV. Analysis and Conclusions

### Overview

This chapter describes the manner in which the documents were input to the content analysis program known as Minnesota Contextual Content Analysis (MCCA). This description is followed by an overview of the output obtained from MCCA and the analysis of that data. Next, conclusions based on the analysis are drawn and reviewed, and suggestions for further research are outlined.

### Input

Fifty-nine State of the Union addresses were reviewed, and selected portions pertaining to foreign policy and international relations were extracted from each document. These extractions were then transcribed verbatim into machine-readable language. These documents were reviewed in three batches. MCCA has the capability of running only 50 pieces of data during a run. Therefore, the 59 pieces of data were processed in one batch consisting of the first 29 years (1934 - 1961) and another batch consisting of the last 30 years (1961 - 1990). In addition to this, the data was grouped by the ten Presidents who gave the speeches, and this final batch was also processed.

When discussing the results, the batches will be referred to as "by year" and "by President" in an attempt to reduce confusion. There were two "extra" addresses made, one in 1953 and another in 1961. These addresses were

included in the data, which explains why there are 59 documents between 1934 and 1990. These excerpts can be found in Appendix A.

### Output

Each batch of input was processed separately, producing a set of several hundred pages of data for each of the three data sets. The data ranged from Context scores (C-scores) and Emphasis scores (E-scores) for each speech, to C-scores and E-scores for MCCA-selected concepts, to matrices plotting differences between speeches.

Initial observation of the by-President matrix generated by MCCA showed extreme differences in C-scores between those speeches made by President Bush and those by all other Presidents. In addition, the data showed many important similarities. All speeches in the by-President group were given extremely low C-scores in the Emotional area, and low C-scores in both the Practical and Analytic areas. Each speech received a high C-score in the Traditional area. (See Table 2).

The extreme differences in Traditional, Practical, and Emotional C-scores between Bush's speeches and the others led the researcher to believe that some measurable change had indeed happened in the recent past. The similarities in the C-scores in the different areas led the researcher to conclude that the selection of State of the Union addresses was in all probability a valid one.


## Specific Results

The C-Scores for the Presidents are shown in Table 2, while the by-year C-scores are in Table 3.

**Table 2 C-scores by President**

GROUP	TRADITIONAL	PRACTICAL	EMOTIONAL	ANALYTICAL	PRESIDENT
A	16.00	3.90	-25.00	6.10	FDR
B	17.65	4.01	-25.00	3.01	TRUMAN
C	12.30	6.18	-25.00	6.98	EISENHOWER
D	11.00	10.02	-25.00	2.40	JFK
E	14.55	4.96	-25.00	6.46	JOHNSON
F	13.36	4.70	-25.00	6.94	NIXON
G	14.30	1.02	-25.00	3.06	FORD
H	17.12	6.27	-25.00	2.61	CARTER
I	15.96	7.74	-25.00	1.26	REAGAN
J	15.15	-10.30	-14.80	6.05	BUSH

The by-President results are more easily interpreted in the following bar graph.



**Figure 3 Bar Chart of C-Scores**

Table 3 By-Year C-scores

YEAR	TRADITIONAL	PRACTICAL	EMOTIONAL	ANALYTICAL
1934	4.6	20.4	-18.6	-6.4
1935	23.7	.0	-25.0	1.3
1936	20.7	4.3	-24.7	-3
1937	12.0	-5	-24.5	13.0
1938	16.8	-3.9	-21.1	8.2
1939	9.8	4.3	-25.0	10.9
1940	21.5	-4	-24.6	3.5
1941	13.0	9.4	-25.0	2.6
1942	18.3	6.7	-22.8	-2.2
1943	6.7	11.5	-25.0	6.8
1944	17.1	-2.7	-22.3	7.9
1945	22.5	-4.7	-20.3	2.5
1946	14.3	6.1	-25.0	4.6
1947	13.9	7.3	-25.0	3.7
1948	16.5	5.9	-25.0	2.6
1949	13.2	5.6	-25.0	6.2
1950	16.0	3.3	-25.0	5.7
1951	24.6	.4	-24.6	-4
1952	16.5	8.5	-23.9	-1.1
1953	14.5	-1.5	-23.5	10.5
1953*	15.6	4.4	-25.0	5.0
1954	15.9	3.5	-25.0	5.6
1955	15.9	7.4	-25.0	1.7
1956	12.0	4.5	-25.0	8.5
1957	12.5	4.7	-25.0	7.8
1958	6.5	9.9	-25.0	8.6
1959	7.4	9.8	-25.0	7.8
1960	4.5	11.8	-25.0	8.7
1961	10.5	12.7	-25.0	1.7
1961*	15.6	5.3	-25.0	4.1
1962	12.2	10.8	-25.0	2.0
1963	8.8	6.5	-25.0	9.7
1964	14.6	5.7	-25.0	4.7
1965	13.3	-8.2	-16.8	11.7
1966	13.7	5.1	-25.0	6.1
1967	14.3	6.5	-25.0	4.3
1968	19.4	5.6	-23.8	-1.2
1969	18.3	4.6	-25.0	2.1
1970	13.6	5.9	-25.0	5.5
1971	13.5	5.8	-25.0	5.7
1972	10.5	3.3	-25.0	11.2
1973	11.2	-4.9	-20.1	13.8
1974	16.5	1.8	-25.0	6.7
1975	14.9	3.6	-25.0	6.5
1976	13.6	1.6	-25.0	9.8
1977	15.0	6.7	-25.0	3.0
1978	12.4	12.6	-22.8	-2.2
1979	22.4	1.4	-25.0	1.3
1980	18.4	1.6	-25.0	5.1
1981	1.0	24.0	-24.9	-.1
1982	25.0	-2.1	-20.1	-2.7
1983	9.3	9.7	-25.0	5.9
1984	25.0	-3.9	-16.2	-5.0
1985	13.0	6.8	-25.0	5.2
1986	17.3	-6.3	-18.7	7.7
1987	4.1	20.9	-14.4	-10.6
1988	8.5	10.2	-25.0	6.2
1989	18.0	-16.3	-8.7	7.0
1990	17.4	1.3	-25.0	6.2

\* Second State of the Union given this year



E-scores were computed for each data set, by year and by President, once by using all 116 concept categories, and a second time using only those categories that showed a difference between data groups (years or Presidents) of 5.0 or more. The data groups broken down by President showed no significant differences between groups, as shown below.

GROUP	ALL	5.0 OR MORE
A	.70	2.39
B	.72	2.42
C	.69	2.46
D	.82	3.01
E	.63	2.25
F	.85	2.79
G	.68	2.40
H	.20	1.66
I	.46	1.90
J	.38	2.01

At first glance, differences in E-scores by year appeared to have no pattern. (See Table 4). It was impossible to match doctrines with specific E-scores or ranges of E-scores. However, when matched against the timeline in Table 1, it becomes evident that a sudden drop in E-scores occurred each time there was a change in the US doctrine or the overall strategy.

Table 4 E-scores By Year

YEAR	E-SCORE	YEAR	E-SCORE
1934	.29	1962	1.44
1935	1.39	1963	.36
1936	.64	1964	.76
1937	.02	1965	1.14
1938	.48	1966	.54
1939	1.36	1967	.51

1940	1.12	1968	.43
1941	.11	1969	1.12
1942	.21	1970	.51
1943	.03	1971	.12
1944	.40	1972	1.09
1945	.91	1973	1.29
1946	.66	1974	.34
1947	.48	1975	.93
1948	.95	1976	.60
1949	1.09	1977	.41
1950	.95	1978	-.05
1951	.32	1979	.03
1952	.50	1980	.08
1953	.30	1981	-.23
1953*	.35	1982	.99
1954	.55	1983	.92
1956	.85	1984	.66
1957	.59	1985	.36
1958	1.24	1986	.96
1959	1.18	1987	-.51
1960	1.02	1988	.31
1961	1.03	1989	.72
1961*	.34	1990	.20

\* Second State of the Union Address given this year

### Statistical Analysis

Statistical analysis was performed using the standard t-test to determine if differences in mean scores were apparent. Both C-scores and E-scores were used. Unless specifically referred to by the type of score, the term "scores" will refer to both C-scores and E-scores. The t-test shows differences in means, which indicate a change between test groups. All t-tests were performed at the 80% confidence level.

The same null and alternative hypotheses were used for all the t-tests in this section. They are:

Ho: The means of the data sets are equal

Ha: The means of the data sets are not equal

The rejection regions differ based on degrees of freedom. For the group to group comparison, the rejection region is less than -1.372 and greater than 1.372. For the other comparisons, the rejection region is less than -1.886 and greater than 1.886.

The first documented change in doctrine occurred in 1945 when America entered the period of Use doctrine. The scores from group 1 (1934 - 1944) were compared to those in group 2 (1945 - 1969). There was no measurable change in mean scores between these two groups. In other words, all t-scores were outside of the rejection region discussed in the previous paragraph.

The next documented doctrinal change occurred in 1970, the beginning of the Deterrence doctrine. Group 2 scores were compared with those in group 3 (1970 - 1983). The t-test revealed changes in the E-scores between these two groups. The E-scores dropped from an average of .75 to an average of .50, and the t-score was in the rejection region at 3.900674, indicating a change in emphasis of the speeches measured.

America entered the period of Defense doctrine in 1984. Group 3 scores were compared to those of group 4 (1984 - 1989). The t-test indicated a change in three areas of C-scores: Practical, Emotional, and Analytic. The t-scores for these scores were 1.685035, -12.7103, and 2.501768, respectively. All of these t-scores were in the rejection region. Group 4 scores were higher in the Practical and

Analytical areas, showing an increase in concentration on those concepts in the speeches measured. The doctrine of Defense is of a practical nature. Focusing on the rational achievement of goals, as explained in the previous chapter, is the focus of the Practical context. The increase in the Analytical perspective indicates the intellectual perspective was predominant in the development of such a doctrine. On the other hand, the Emotional C-scores showed a marked decrease in group 4. This indicates a decreasing tendency to let emotions, either positive or negative, affect doctrinal decisions.

Group 4 scores were then compared to the final year in the study, 1990. These results indicated a change only in the Emotional contextual area. The t-test indicated a t-score of 1.911399, which is in the rejection region, marking an increase in the Emotional C-scores in 1990, indicating that expressions of emotions and personal involvement are included in doctrine development. Defense against nuclear weapons is a very emotional topic. If the US were to have an "effective" defense against missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, would that indeed deter the Soviet Union? Obviously, an emotional debate can ensue from this question.

These results proved to be inconclusive. Some documented changes in doctrine were backed up by changes in C-scores and E-scores, while others were not. As was stated in the previous chapter, changes in attitude often occur

before changes in behavior. For this reason, and because of the time-consuming effort of determining doctrine and strategy, scores from three years preceding documented doctrinal changes were averaged and compared to scores from the year when the documented change in doctrine occurred.

All C-scores and E-scores from 1942, 1943, and 1944 were averaged and compared to the scores of 1945. This comparison showed decreases in the Traditional and Emotional C-scores as well as in the E-score. There was also an increase in the Practical C-scores. The t-scores were -2.30 for the Traditional score, 2.37 for the Practical score, -3.7 for the Emotional score, and -6.52 for the E-score. All these t-scores were in the rejection region.

America entered the Use doctrine in 1945, obviously a less traditional stance than America had taken in the past. This could explain the drop in Traditional scores. The drop in Emotional scores and rise in Practical scores can be explained easily. The US doctrine became more practical in nature through directing itself at the rational achievement of goals; this in itself lowers the amount of emotions allowed to enter the decision to use nuclear weapons.

America began the doctrine of Deterrence in 1970. The scores for 1967, 1968, and 1969 were averaged and compared to 1970. The t-scores showed changes in both the Traditional and Analytical scores. The Traditional scores increased, with a t-score of 2.409299, in the rejection region, showing a movement back to standards and codes

guiding social behavior. The concept of deterrence seems to go hand in hand with such traditional values as the personal safety of loved ones, in this case, the citizens of the US. The Analytical score, however, decreased, with a t-score of -2.35673, also in the rejection region, showing less of a tendency to define situations in objective terms.

In the year 1984, America entered the period of the doctrine of Defense. Scores from 1981, 1982, and 1983 were compared to the scores of 1984. The t-test showed an increase in both Practical and Analytical scores and a decrease in Emotional scores. The t-score for the Practical score was 1.91273, Analytic was 2.369305, and Emotional - 4.41167. All three t-scores were in the rejection region. Once again America's leadership was thinking pragmatically. Defense against nuclear attack appears to be less of an emotional topic than originally discovered in the group by group comparison.

The scores from 1987, 1988, and 1989 were compared to the scores from 1990. The t-score of 1.877541, in the rejection region, revealed an increase in Emotional scores. This indicates that the President is allowing more emotions (both positive and negative) to effect his thinking, which in turn effects his doctrine and strategy determination.

The comparison of three-year averages to years of documented doctrine changes appears to indicate the possibility of predicting future changes based on t-test results such as described in this thesis. Of course, there

are many other types of changes occurring during these same time frames. One of the other classes of changes include strategy updates which happen during doctrines. By referring once more to the timeline in Table 1, it can be seen that these strategy updates occurred in the years 1951, 1953, 1967, 1971, 1974, 1979, and 1984. These years were compared to the respective previous three years, again by using the standard t-test.

Scores from 1948, 1949, and 1950 were compared to those of 1951. The t-scores show changes in all categories except Emotional. Traditional scores had a t-score of -9.12165, Practical showed a t-score of 5.52007, Analytical was 4.647901, and E-score was 14.5, all within the rejection region. America changed it's strategy to one of massive retaliation in 1951, setting a precedence in the world. Traditional scores dropped dramatically in 1951, indicating putting aside such traditional values as the worth of human lives other than one's own countrymen. On the other hand, Practical and Analytical scores rose, showing more emphasis on goal attainment and objectivity. Surprisingly, there was no change in the Emotional scores; the average of the three year period was 25.0, as was the score for 1951.

The US changed its strategy in 1953 to that of flexible response. The scores from 1950, 1951, and 1952 were contrasted with those of 1953. Changes were evident in the Practical, Emotional, and Analytical scores. The increase in Practical scores with a t-score of 2.349318 seems to

point to the pragmatic understanding that massive retaliation is an unreasonable response to the Soviet threat; instead there is the understanding that the US will counter any threat in a like manner as the threat is made. The drop in Emotional scores in 1953 showing a t-score of -3.11086 may be explained by a lessening of overall aggression toward the Soviets. The lower Analytical score, t-score of -4.21399, in this year of change may indicate more of a reliance on emotions and less on objectivity. All three t-scores were within the rejection region.

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) began in 1967. This is the period in history when the US and the Soviet Union reached an uneasy parity in their respective nuclear arsenals. It was agreed to by both sides that each adversary had sufficient weapons to destroy the other many times over. Comparison of scores from 1964, 1965, and 1966 to those of 1967 using the t-test showed no differences in any of the scores. All t-scores were outside of the rejection region defined above.

Shortly after the dawning of the Deterrence doctrine, America began the strategy of Arms Control. The scores from 1968, 1969, and 1970 were compared with the scores from 1971. The results showed an increase in both the Traditional C-score and the E-score, reflecting a change in emphasis. The Traditional score had a t-score of 2.024091, and the E-score showed a t-score of 2.600653, both within the rejection region. Evidently traditional values were



once more taken into consideration during policy development; it is more traditional, for instance to protect one's citizenry from war through an effective deterrent than to risk their lives through such a strategy as MAD.

Detente became the wave of the strategy builders in 1974, emphasizing a decrease in hostilities between the US and the USSR. Comparison of the scores from 1971, 1972, and 1973 to those of 1974 revealed a decrease in the Traditional scores, with a t-score of -5.26034, which is in the rejection region. Perhaps seeing the Soviets as enemies had by this time become tradition; a lowering of this score allowing the US to begin to change this view.

Collective security became the watchword in 1979. A comparison was made between the scores of 1976, 1977, and 1978 and those of 1979. The test results showed an impressive decrease in the Traditional score, with a t-score of -11.6244, well within the rejection region, further indication that seeing the Soviets as enemies had become a traditional viewpoint in the US. The approach of collective security for the world indicates movement away from this thought process.

Again, it is important to note that both doctrine and strategy are not static by nature; they can and should be changed to fit the needs and situation of the world. Vegetius points out the importance of planning doctrine and strategy based on real-world situations:

... the most material article is to determine whether it is most proper to temporize or to bring the affair to a speedy decision by action. The enemy sometimes expect an expedition will soon be over; and if it is protracted... his troops are either consumed by want, induced to return home... or disperse themselves from despair of success (25:145).

Indeed, Napoleon, one of history's great strategists, set forth this 5th Maxim of War:

All wars should be systematic, for every war should have an aim and be conducted in conformity with the principles and rules of the art. War should be undertaken with forces corresponding to the magnitude of the obstacles that are to be anticipated (25:408, emphasis added).

There was a drop in E-scores in 1990, and the t-test results showed changes in the Emotional C-score. This fact, along with the following statement from Fred C. Ikle, former Undersecretary for Policy in the DOD, led this researcher to some important conclusions.

"There exists no rational basis" for deterrence, because "those calculated decisions which our deterrent seeks to prevent are not the sole processes that could lead to nuclear war... We are making survival depend on the rationality of all future leaders in all major wars" (29:73).

### Conclusions

Based upon the evidence presented, it is evident that some type of change occurred between the years 1988 and 1990. Since the State of the Union addresses are believed to represent the attitude of the US toward the Soviet Union, it appears as if this attitude has changed. The statistical differences in C-scores and E-scores bears out this change. President Bush has shown to express far less of the

practical aspects in his speeches, and concentrates on the traditional. Remember that the traditional context shows that the social situation predominates, and that the situation is defined in terms of standards, rules and codes that guide social behavior. This could well refer to the changes made throughout the Communist Bloc. The practical context, on the other hand, takes a pragmatic perspective, and focuses on the rational achievement of goals. With the fall of Communism, it stands to reason that America has few goals in the foreign relations area in relation to the Soviets.

Based on this dramatic difference in C-scores, and the statistical differences seen in E-scores during President Bush's term of office, it is apparent that the time has come to review and update the doctrine and overall strategy of the United States.

Because no correlation was evident between C-scores or E-scores and specific doctrines or strategies, it was not possible to construct a model with which to determine exactly what should be the new strategy. Contextual content analysis was a good beginning to this research, but work must be continued to determine the new doctrinal changes.

To summarize the findings, the reader may review chapter 2 to find the definitions used in this thesis for the terms doctrine and strategy. The current doctrine of the United States is Defense, with the strategy of Strategic Defense Initiative development. Because of the political

and military changes discussed in chapters 1 and 2, and the changes in scores discussed in this chapter, it is evident that the current strategy and doctrine do not fit the current world situation. Because it is time for the United States to change the overall doctrine and strategy, it is also time for the USAF to do the same based on those changes made by the President and his National Security Council.

#### Suggestions For Further Study

Now that it is possible, through the use of contextual content analysis, to help determine the need for changes in doctrine and strategy, it is necessary to construct models from which to determine what type of strategy changes should be made. With the overwhelming amount of data available from MCCA, it may also be possible to make further correlations between C-scores and E-scores and the type of change made. Perhaps specific concept category use will also point to other areas of interest in the fields of foreign policy and international relations.

The researcher will maintain all data in its original form for a period of three years, in the event that future researchers will require this data.

#### Summary

This final chapter overviews the manner in which the data was processed using MCCA, as well as the output of the analysis. Conclusions were drawn based on analysis of the output and expert opinions in the field of strategy. It was

not possible to correlate C-scores or E-scores to specific strategies or doctrine, but the changes in the past were marked by changes in C-scores and E-scores. E-scores dropped in 1990, and the Emotional C-score increased, pointing out a need to update the current doctrine and strategy of the United States. After the discussion of the conclusions, the chapter outlined some suggestions for future researchers wishing to build on this study.

Appendix A. State of the Union Excerpts Used With MCCA

1934:

The delegation representing the United States has worked in close cooperation with the other American Republics assembled at Montevideo to make that conference an outstanding success. We have, I hope, made it clear to our neighbors that we seek with them future avoidance of territorial expansion and of interference by one nation in the internal affairs of another. Furthermore, all of us are seeking the restoration of commerce in ways which will preclude the building up of large favorable trade balances by any one nation at the expense of trade debits on the part of other nations.

In other parts of the world, however, fear of immediate or future aggression and with this the spending of vast sums on armament and the continued building up of defensive trade barriers prevent any great progress in peace or trade agreements. I have made it clear that the United States cannot take part in political arrangements in Europe but that we stand ready to cooperate at any time in practicable measures on a world basis looking to immediate reduction of armaments and the lowering of the barriers against commerce.

I expect to report to you later in regard to debts owed the government and people of this country by the governments and peoples of other countries. Several nations, acknowledging the debt, have paid in small part; other nations have failed to pay. One nation -- Finland -- has paid the installments due this country in full.

1935:

I cannot with candor tell you that general international relationships outside the borders of the United States are improved. On the surface of things many old jealousies are resurrected, old passions aroused; new strivings for armament and power, in more than one land, rear their ugly heads. I hope that calm counsel and constructive leadership will provide the steadying influence and the time necessary for the coming of new and more practical forms of representative government throughout the world wherein privilege and power will occupy a lesser place and world welfare a greater.

I believe, however, that our own peaceful and neighborly attitude toward other nations is coming to be understood and appreciated. The maintenance of international peace is a matter in which we are deeply and unselfishly concerned. Evidence of our persistent and undeniable desire to prevent armed conflict has recently been more than once afforded.

There is no ground for apprehension that our relations with any nation will be otherwise than peaceful. Nor is there ground for doubt that the people of most nations seek relief from the threat and burden attaching to the false

theory that extravagant armament cannot be reduced and limited by international accord.

1936:

You will remember that on that 4th day of March 1933, the world picture was an image of substantial peace. International consultation and widespread hope for the bettering of relations between the nations gave to all of us a reasonable expectation that the barriers to mutual confidence, to increased trade, and to the peaceful settlement of disputes could be progressively removed. In fact my only reference to the field of world policy in that address was in these words: "I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor -- the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others -- a neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors."

In the years that have followed that sentiment has remained the dedication of this Nation. Among the nations of the great Western Hemisphere the policy of the good neighbor has happily prevailed. At no time in the four and a half centuries of modern civilization in the Americas has there existed -- in any year, any decade, or any generation in all that time -- a greater spirit of mutual understanding, of common helpfulness, and of devotion to the ideals of self-government than exists today in the 21 American Republics and their neighbor, the Dominion of Canada. This policy of the good neighbor among the Americas is no longer a hope -- no longer an objective remaining to be accomplished; it is a fact, active, present, pertinent, and effective. In this achievement every American nation takes an understanding part. There is neither war nor rumor of war no desire for war. The inhabitants of this vast area, 250,000,000 strong, spreading more than 8,000 miles from the Arctic to the Antarctic, believe in and propose to follow the policy of the good neighbor; and they wish with all their heart that the rest of the world might do likewise.

But the policy of the United States has been clear and consistent. We have sought with earnestness in every possible way to limit world armaments and to attain the peaceful solution of disputes among all nations.

We have sought by every legitimate means to exert our moral influence against repression, against discrimination, against intolerance and autocracy, and in favor of freedom of expression, equality before the law, religious tolerance, and popular rule.

As a consistent part of a clear policy, the United States is following a twofold neutrality toward any and all nations which engage in wars that are not of immediate concern to the Americas. First, we decline to encourage the

prosecution of war by permitting belligerents to obtain arms, ammunition, or implements of war from the United States. Second, we seek to discourage the use by belligerent nations of any and all American products calculated to facilitate the prosecution of a war in quantities over and above our normal exports to them in time of peace.

1937:

I have recently visited three of our sister republics in South America. The very cordial receptions with which I was greeted were in tribute to democracy. To me the outstanding observation of that visit was that the masses of the peoples of all the Americas are convinced that the democratic form of government can be made to succeed and do not wish to substitute for it any other form of government. They believe that democracies are best able to cope with the changing problems of modern civilization within themselves, and that democracies are best able to maintain peace among themselves.

The Inter-American Conference, operating on these fundamental principles of democracy, did much to assure peace in this hemisphere. Existing peace machinery was improved. New instruments to maintain peace and eliminate causes of war were adopted. Wider protection of the interests of the American republics in the event of war outside the Western Hemisphere was provided. Respect for, and observance of, international treaties and international law were strengthened. Principles of liberal trade policies, as effective aids to the maintenance of peace were reaffirmed. The intellectual and cultural relationships among American republics were broadened as a part of the general peace program.

In a world unhappily thinking in terms of war, the representatives of 21 nations sat around a table, in an atmosphere of complete confidence and understanding, sincerely discussing measures for maintaining peace. Here was a great and a permanent achievement directly affecting the lives and security of the 250,000,000 human beings who dwell in this Western Hemisphere. Here was an example which must have a wholesome effect upon the rest of the world.

In a very real sense, the conference in Buenos Aires sent forth a message on behalf of all the democracies of the world to those nations which live otherwise. Because such other governments are perhaps more spectacular, it was high time for democracy to assert itself.

1938:

In addressing the Congress on the state of the Union present facts and future hazards demand that I speak clearly



and earnestly of the causes which underlie events of profound concern to all.

In spite of the determination of this Nation for peace, it has become clear that acts and policies of nations in other parts of the world have far-reaching effects, not only upon their immediate neighbors but also on us.

I am thankful that I can tell you that our Nation is at peace. It has been kept at peace despite provocations which in other days, because of their seriousness, could well have engendered war. The people of the United States and the Government of the United States have shown capacity for restraint and a civilized approach to the purposed of peace, while at the same time we maintain the integrity inherent in the sovereignty of 130,000,000 people, lest we weaken or destroy our influence for peace and jeopardize the sovereignty itself.

It is our traditional policy to live at peace with other nations. More than that, we have been among the leaders in advocating the use of pacific methods of discussion and conciliation in international differences. We have striven for the reduction of military forces.

But in a world of high tension and disorder, in a world where stable civilization is actually threatened, it becomes the responsibility of each nations which strives for peace at home and peace with and among others to be strong enough to assure the observance of those fundamentals of peaceful solution of conflicts which are the only ultimate basis for orderly existence.

Resolute in our determination to respect the rights of others and to command respect for the rights of ourselves, we must keep ourselves adequately strong in self-defense.

There is a trend in the world away from the observance both of the letter and the spirit of treaties. We propose to observe, as we have in the past, our own treaty obligations; but we cannot be certain of reciprocity on the part of others.

Disregard for treaty obligation seems to have followed the surface trend away from the democratic representative form of government. It would seem, therefore, that world peace through international agreements is most safe in the hands of democratic representative governments -- or, in other words, peace is most greatly jeopardized in and by those nations where democracy has been discarded or has never developed.

I have used the words "surface trend," for I still believe that civilized man increasingly insists, and in the long run will insist, on genuine participation in his own government. Our people believe that over the years democracies of the world will survive, and democracy will be restored or established in those nations which today know it not. In that faith lies the future peace of mankind.

1939:

A war which threatened to envelop the world in flames has been averted, but it has become increasingly clear that peace is not assured.

That hemisphere, that peace, and that ideal we propose to do our share in protecting against storms from any quarter. Our people and our resources are pledged to secure that protection. From that determination no American flinches.

This by no means implies that the American Republics disassociate themselves from the nations of other continents - it does not mean the Americas against the rest of the world. We as one of the republics reiterate our willingness to help the cause of world peace. We stand on our historic offer to take counsel with all other nations of the world to the end that aggression among them be terminated, that the race of armaments cease and that commerce be renewed.

But the world has grown so small and weapons of attack so swift that no nation can be safe in its will to peace so long as any other single powerful nation refuses to settle its grievances at the council table.

For if any government bristling with implements of war insists of policies of force, weapons of defense give the only safety.

In our foreign relations we have learned from the past what not to do. From new wars we have learned what we must do.

We have learned that effective timing of defense, and the distant points from which attacks may be launched are completely different from what they were 20 years ago.

We have learned that survival cannot be guaranteed by arming after the attack begins -- for there is new range and speed to offense.

We have learned that long before any overt military act, aggression begins with preliminaries of propaganda, subsidized penetration, the loosening of ties of good will, the stirring of prejudice, and the incitement to disunion.

We have learned that God-fearing democracies of the world which observe the sanctity of treaties and good faith in their dealings with other actions cannot safely be indifferent to international lawlessness anywhere. They cannot forever let pass, without effective protest, acts of aggression against sister nations -- acts which automatically undermine all of us.

Obviously they must proceed along practical, peaceful lines. But the mere fact that we rightly decline to intervene with arms to prevent acts of aggression does not mean that we must act as if there were no aggression at all. Words may be futile, but war is not the only means of commanding a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. There are many methods short of war, but stronger and more

effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggressor governments the aggregate sentiments of our own people.

At the very least, we can and should avoid any action, or any lack of action, which will encourage, assist, or build up an aggressor. We have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly -- may actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim. The instinct of self-preservation should warn us that we ought not to let that happen anymore.

And we have learned something else -- the old, old lesson that probability of attack is mightily decreased by the assurance of an ever ready defense. Since 1931 world events of thunderous import have moved with lightning speed. During these 8 years many of our people clung to the hope that the innate decency of mankind would protect the unprepared who showed their innate trust in mankind. Today we are all wiser -- and sadder.

Under modern conditions what we mean by "adequate defense" -- a policy subscribed to by all -- must be divided into three elements. First we must have armed forces and defenses strong enough to ward off sudden attack against strategic positions and key facilities essential to ensure sustained resistance and ultimate victory. Secondly, we must have the organization and location of those key facilities so that they may be immediately utilized and rapidly expanded to meet all needs without danger of serious interruption by enemy attack.

In the course of a few days I shall send you a special message making recommendations for those two essentials of defense against danger which we cannot safely assume will not come.

If these first two essentials are reasonably provided for, we must be able confidently to invoke the third element, the underlying strength of citizenship -- the self-confidence, the ability, the imagination, and the devotion that give the staying power to see thing through.

A strong and united nation may be destroyed if it is unprepared against sudden attack. But even a nation well armed and well organized from a strictly military standpoint, may, after a period of time, meet defeat if it is unnerved by self-distrust, endangered by class prejudice, by dissension between capital and labor, by false economy, and by other unsolved social problems at home.

In meeting the troubles of the world we must meet them as one people -- with a unity born of the fact that for generations those who have come to our shores, representing many kindreds and tongues, have been welded by common opportunity into a united patriotism. If another form of government can present a united front in its attack on a democracy, the attack must be met by a united democracy. Such a democracy can and must exist in the United States.

A dictatorship may command the full strength of a regimented nation. But the united strength of a democratic nation can be mustered only when its people, educated by modern standards to know what is going on and where they are going, have conviction that they are receiving as large a share of opportunity for development, as large a share of material success and of human dignity, as they have a right to receive.

Our Nation's program of social and economic reform is therefore a part of defense as basic as armaments themselves.

1940:

As the Congress reassembles, the impact of wars abroad makes it natural to approach "the state of the Union" through a discussion of foreign affairs.

But it is important that those who hear and read this message should in no way confuse that approach with any thought that our Government is abandoning, or even overlooking, the great significance of its domestic policies.

The social and economic forces which have been mismanaged abroad until they have resulted in revolution, dictatorship, and war are the same as those which we here are struggling to adjust peacefully at home.

I can understand the feelings of those who warn the Nation that they will never again consent to the sending of American youth to fight on the soil of Europe. But, as I remember, nobody has asked them to consent -- for nobody expects such an undertaking.

The overwhelming majority of our fellow citizens do not abandon in the slightest their hope and expectation that the United States will not become involved in military participation in the war.

I can also understand the wishfulness of those who oversimplify the whole situation by repeating that all we have to do is to mind our own business and keep the Nation out of war. But there is a vast difference between keeping out of war and pretending that this war is none of our business.

We do not have to go to war with other nations, but at least we can strive with other nations to encourage the kind of peace that will lighten the troubles of the world, and by so doing help our own Nation as well.

I ask that all of us everywhere think thing through with the single aim of how best to serve the future of our own Nation. I do not mean merely its future relationship with the outside world. I mean its domestic future as well -- the work, the security, the prosperity, the happiness, the life of all the boys and girls of the United States, as they are inevitably affected by such world relationships. for it becomes clearer and clearer that the

future world will be a shabby and dangerous place to live in -- even for Americans to live in -- if it is ruled by force in the hands of a few.

Already the crash of swiftly moving events over the earth has made us all think with a longer view. Fortunately, that thinking cannot be controlled by partisanship. The time is long past when any political party or any particular group can curry and capture public favor by labeling itself the "peace party" or the "peace bloc." That label belongs to the whole United States and to every right thinking man, woman, and child within it.

For out of all the military and diplomatic turmoil, out of all the propaganda and counterpropaganda of the present conflicts, there are two facts which stand out and which the whole world acknowledges.

The first is that never before has the Government of the United States done so much as in our recent past to establish and maintain the policy of the good neighbor with its sister nations.

The second is that in almost every nation in the world today there is a true public belief that the United States has been, and will continue to be, a potent and active factor in seeking the reestablishment of peace.

In these recent years we have had a clean record of peace and good will. It is an open book that cannot be twisted or defamed. It is a record that must be continued and enlarged.

So I hope that Americans everywhere will work out for themselves the several alternatives which lie before world civilization, which necessarily includes our own.

We must look ahead and see the possibilities for our children if the rest of the world comes to be dominated by concentrated force alone -- even though today we are a very great and a very powerful nation.

We must look ahead and see the effect on our own future if all the small nations throughout the world have their independence snatched from them or become mere appendages to relatively vast and powerful military systems.

We must look ahead and see the kind of lives our children would have to lead if a large part of the rest of the world were compelled to worship the god imposed by a military ruler, or were forbidden to worship God at all; if the rest of the world were forbidden to read and hear the facts -- the daily news of their own and other nations -- if they were deprived of the truth which makes men free.

We must look ahead and see the effect on our future generations if world trade is controlled by any nation or group of nations which sets up that control through military force.

It is, of course, true that the record of past centuries includes destruction of small nations, enslavement of peoples, and building of empires on the foundation of force. But wholly apart from the greater international

morality which we seek today, we recognize the practical fact that with modern weapons and modern conditions, modern man can no longer live a civilized life if we are to go back to the practice of wars and conquests of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Summing up this need of looking ahead, and in words of common sense and good American citizenship, I hope that we will have fewer American ostriches in our midst. It is not good for the ultimate health of ostriches to bury their heads in the sand.

Only an ostrich would look upon these wars through the eyes of cynicism or ridicule.

Of course, the peoples of other nations have the right to choose their own form of government. But we in this Nation still believe that such choice should be predicated on certain freedoms which we think are essential everywhere. We know that we ourselves will never be wholly safe at home unless other governments recognize such freedoms.

Twenty-one American republics, expressing the will of 250,000,000 people to preserve peace and freedom in this hemisphere are displaying a unanimity of ideals and practical relationships which gives hope that what is being done here can be done on other continents. We in all the Americas are coming to the realization that we can retain our respective nationalities without, at the same time, threatening the national existence of our neighbors.

Doctrines which set group against group, faith against faith, race against race, class against class, fanning the fires of hatred in men too despondent, too desperate to think for themselves, were used as rabble-rousing slogans on which dictators could ride to power. And once in power they could saddle their tyrannies on whole nations, and on their weaker neighbors.

This is the danger to which we in America must begin to be more alert. For the apologist for foreign aggressors, and equally those selfish and partisan groups at home who wrap themselves in a false mantle of Americanism to promote their own economic, financial, or political advantage, are now trying European tricks upon us, seeking to muddy the stream of our national thinking, weakening us in the face of danger, by trying to set our own people to fighting among themselves. Such tactics are what have helped to plunge Europe into war. We must combat them, as we would the plague, if American integrity and security are to be preserved. We cannot afford to face the future as a disunited people.

1941:

Even when the World War broke out in 1914, it seemed to contain only small threat of danger to our own American future. But, as time went on, the American people began to

visualize what the downfall of democratic nations might mean to our own democracy.

Just as our national policy in internal affairs has been based upon a decent respect for the rights and dignity of all our fellow men within our gates, so our national policy in foreign affairs has been based on a decent respect for the rights and dignity of all nations, large and small. And the justice of morality must and will win in the end.

Our national policy is this:

First, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to all-inclusive national defense.

Second, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to full support of all those resolute peoples, everywhere, who are resisting aggression and are thereby keeping war away from our hemisphere. By this support, we express our determination that the democratic cause shall prevail; and we strengthen the defense and security of our own Nation.

Third, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom.

In the recent national election there was no substantial difference between the two great parties in respect to that national policy. No issue was fought out on this line before the American electorate. Today, it is abundantly evident that American citizens everywhere are demanding and supporting speedy and complete action in recognition of obvious danger.

Therefore, the immediate need is a swift and driving increase in our armament production.

I also ask this Congress for authority and for funds sufficient to manufacture additional munitions and war supplies of many kinds, to be turned over to those nations which are now in actual war with aggressor nations.

Our most useful and immediate role is to act as an arsenal for them as well as for ourselves. They do not need man power. They do need billions of dollars worth of the weapons of defense.

The time is near when they will not be able to pay for them in ready cash. We cannot, and will not, tell them they must surrender, merely because of present inability to pay for the weapons which we know they must have.

I do not recommend that we make them a loan of dollars with which to pay for these weapons -- a loan to be repaid in dollars.

I recommend that we make if possible for those nations to continue to obtain war materials in the United States, fitting their orders into our own program. Nearly all of

their materiel would, if the time ever came, be useful for our own defense.

In fulfillment of this purpose we will not be intimidated by the threats of dictators that they will regard as a breach of international law and as an act of war our aid to the democracies which dare to resist their aggression. Such aid is not an act of war, even if a dictator should unilaterally proclaim it so to be.

When the dictators are ready to make war upon us, they will not wait for an act of war on our part. They did not wait for Norway or Belgium or the Netherlands to commit an act of war.

Their only interest is in a new one-way international law, which lacks mutuality in its observance, and, therefore, becomes an instrument of oppression.

1942:

Powerful and offensive actions must and will be taken in proper time. The consolidation of the United Nations' total war effort against our common enemies is being achieved.

That is the purpose of conferences which have been held during the past 2 weeks in Washington, in Moscow, and in Chungking. That is the primary objective of the declaration of solidarity signed in Washington on January 1, 1942, by 26 nations united against the Axis Powers.

Difficult choices may have to be made in the months to come. We will not shrink from such decisions. We and those united with us will make those decisions with courage and determination,

Plans have been laid here and in the other capitals for coordinated and cooperative action by all the United Nations -- military action and economic action. Already we have established unified command of land, sea, and air forces in the southwestern Pacific theater of war. There will be a continuation of conferences and consultations among military staffs, so that the plans and operations of each will fit into a general strategy designed to crush the enemy. We shall not fight isolated wars -- each nation going its own way. These 26 nations are united -- not in spirit and determination alone, but in the broad conduct of the war in all its phases.

For the first time since the Japanese and the Fascists and the Nazis started along their bloodstained course of conquest they now face the fact that superior forces are assembling against them. Gone forever are the days when the aggressors could attack and destroy their victims one by one without unity of resistance. We of the United Nations will so dispose our forces that we can strike at the common enemy wherever the greatest damage can be done.



The militarists in Berlin and Tokyo started this war. But the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it.

Our own objectives are clear; the objective of smashing the militarism imposed by war lords upon their enslaved peoples -- the objective of liberating the subjugated nations -- the objective of establishing and securing freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear everywhere in the world.

We shall not stop short of these objectives -- nor shall we be satisfied merely to gain them and then call it a day. I know that I speak for the American people -- and I have good reason to believe I speak also for all the other peoples who fight with us -- when I say that this time we are determined not only to win the war, but also to maintain the security of the peace which will follow.

American armed forces will help to protect this hemisphere -- and also bases outside this hemisphere, which could be used for an attack on the Americas.

1943:

By far the largest and most important developments in the whole strategic picture of 1942 were the events on the long fronts in Russia: First, the implacable defense of Stalingrad; and, second, the offensives by the Russian armies at various points which started in the latter part of November and which still roll on with great force and effectiveness.

We pay the tribute of the United States of America to the fighting men of Russia and China and Britain and the various members of the British Commonwealth -- the millions of men who through the years of this war have fought our common enemies, and have denied to them the world conquest which they sought.

We pay tribute to the soldiers and fliers and seamen of others of the United Nations whose countries have been overrun by Axis hordes.

Yes -- the Nazis and the Fascists have asked for it -- and they are going to get it.

Our forward progress in this war has depended upon our progress on the production front.

1944:

This Nation in the past 2 years has become an active partner in the world's greatest war against human slavery.

We have joined with like-minded people in order to defend ourselves in a world that has been gravely threatened with gangster rule.

But I do not think that any of us Americans can be content with mere survival. Sacrifices that we and our allies are making impose upon us all a sacred obligation to

see to it that out of this war we and our children will gain something better than mere survival.

We are united in determination that this war shall not be followed by another interim which leads to new disaster - that we shall not repeat the tragic errors of ostrich isolationism -- that we shall not repeat the excesses of the wild twenties when this Nation went for a joy ride on a roller coaster which ended in a tragic crash.

When Mr. Hull went to Moscow in October, and when I went to Cairo and Tehran in November, we knew that we were in agreement with our allies in our common determination to fight and win this war. But there were many vital questions concerning the future peace, and they were discussed in an atmosphere of complete candor and harmony.

In the last war such discussions, such meetings, did not even begin until the shooting had stopped and the delegates began to assemble at the peace table. There had been no previous opportunities for man-to-man discussions which lead to meetings of minds. The result was a peace which was not a peace.

That was a mistake which we are not repeating in this war.

Of course we made some commitments. We most certainly committed ourselves to very large and very specific military plans which require the use of all allied forces to bring about the defeat of our enemies at the earliest possible time.

But there were no secret treaties or political or financial commitments.

The one supreme objective for the future, which we discussed for each nation individually, and for all the United Nations, can be summed up in one word: Security.

And that means not only physical security which provides safety from attacks by aggressors. it means also economic security, social security, moral security -- in a family of nations.

China and Russia are truly united with Britain and America in recognition of this essential fact:

The best interests of each nation, large and small, demand that all freedom-loving nations shall join together in a just and durable system of peace. In the present world situation, evidenced by the actions of Germany, Italy, and Japan, unquestioned military control over disturbers of the peace is as necessary among nations as it is among citizens in a community. And an equally basic essential to peace is a decent standard of living for all individual men and women and children in all nations. Freedom from fear is eternally linked with freedom from want.

1945:

This war must be waged -- it is being waged -- with the greatest and most persistent intensity. Everything we are

and have is at stake. Everything we are and have will be given. American men, fighting far from home, have already won victories which the world will never forget.

We have no question of the ultimate victory. We have no question of the cost. Our losses will be heavy.

Further desperate attempts may well be made to break our lines, to slow our progress. We must never make the mistake of assuming that the Germans are beaten until the last Nazi has surrendered.

The wedge that the Germans attempted to drive in western Europe was less dangerous in actual terms of winning the war than the wedges which they are continually attempting to drive between ourselves and our allies.

Every little rumor which is intended to weaken our faith in our allies is like an actual enemy agent in our midst -- seeking to sabotage our war effort. There are, here and there, evil and baseless rumors against the Russians -- rumors against the British -- rumors against our own American commanders in the field.

When you examine these rumors closely, you will observe that every one of them bears the same trade-mark -- "Made in Germany."

We must resist this divisive propaganda -- we must destroy it -- with the same strength and the same determination that our fighting men are displaying as they resist and destroy the panzer divisions.

In the future we must never forget the lesson that we have learned -- that we must have friends who will work with us in peace as they have fought at our side in war.

In the field of foreign policy, we propose to stand together with the United Nations not for the war alone but for the victory for which the war is fought.

It is not only a common danger which unites us but a common hope. Ours is an association not of governments but of peoples -- and the peoples' hope is peace. here, as in England; in England, as in Russia; in Russia, as in China; in France, and through the continent of Europe, and throughout the world; wherever men love freedom, the hope and purpose of the people are for peace -- a peace that is durable and secure.

It will not be easy to create this peoples' peace. We delude ourselves if we believe that the surrender of the armies of our enemies will make the peace we long for. The unconditional surrender of the armies of our enemies is the first and necessary step -- but the first step only.

We have seen already, in areas liberated from the Nazi and the Fascist tyranny, what problems peace will bring. And we delude ourselves if we attempt to believe wishfully that all these problems can be solved overnight.

The firm foundation can be built -- and it will be built. But the continuance and assurance of a living peace must, in the long run, be the work of the people themselves.

Perfectionism, no less than isolationism or imperialism or power politics, may obstruct the paths to international peace. Let us not forget that the retreat to isolationism a quarter of a century ago was started not by a direct attack against international cooperation but against the alleged imperfections of the peace.

In our disillusionment after the last war we preferred international anarchy to international cooperation with nations which did not see and think exactly as we did. We gave up the hope of gradually achieving a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfill our responsibilities in an admittedly imperfect world.

We must not let that happen again, or we shall follow the same tragic road again -- the road to a third world war.

And we shall not hesitate to use our influence -- and to use it now -- to secure so far as is humanly possible the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. We have not shrunk from the military responsibilities brought on by this war. We cannot and will not shrink from the political responsibilities which follow in the wake of battle.

I am clear in my own mind that, as an essential factor in the maintenance of peace in the future, we must have universal military training after this war, and I shall send a special message to the Congress on this subject.

An enduring peace cannot be achieved without a strong America -- strong in the social and economic sense as well as in the military sense.

1946:

Our most immediate task toward that end is to deprive our enemies completely and forever of their power to start another war. Of even greater importance to the preservation of international peace is the need to preserve the wartime agreement of the United Nations and to direct it into the ways of peace.

We have solemnly dedicated ourselves and all our will to the success of the United Nations Organization. For this reason we have sought to insure that in the peacemaking the smaller nations shall have a voice as well as the larger states. The agreement reached at Moscow last month preserves this opportunity in the making of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. The United States intends to preserve it when the treaties with Germany and Japan are drawn.

It will be the continuing policy of the United States to use all its influence to foster, support, and develop the United Nations Organization in its purpose of preventing international war. If peace is to endure it must rest upon justice no less than upon power. The question is how justice among nations is best achieved. We know from day-to-day experience that the chance for a just solution is

immeasurably increased when everyone directly interested is given a voice. that does not mean that each must enjoy an equal voice, but it does mean that each must be heard.

The great and dominant objective of United States foreign policy is to build and preserve a just peace. The peace we seek is not peace for twenty years. It is a permanent peace. At a time when massive changes are occurring with lightning speed throughout the world, it is often difficult to perceive how this central objective is best served in one isolated complex situation or another. Despite this very real difficulty, there are certain basic propositions to which the United States adheres and to which we shall continue to adhere.

One proposition is that lasting peace requires genuine understanding and active cooperation among the most powerful nations. Another is that even the support of the strongest nations cannot guarantee a peace unless it is infused with the quality of justice for all nations.

We seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage. We have no plans for aggression against any other state, large or small. We have no objective which need clash with the peaceful aims of any other nation.

We believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of them by force.

We shall approve no territorial changes in any friendly part of the world unless they accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.

We believe that all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government by their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source. That is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere.

By combined and cooperative action of our war allies, we shall help the defeated enemy states establish peaceful democratic governments of their own free choice. And we shall try to attain a world in which nazism, fascism, and military aggression cannot exist.

We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power. In some cases it may be impossible to prevent forceful imposition of such a government. But the United States will not recognize any such government.

We believe that all nations should have the freedom of the seas and equal rights to the navigation of boundary rivers and waterways and of rivers and waterways which pass through more than one country.

We believe that all states which are accepted in the society of nations should have access on equal terms to the trade and the raw materials of the world.

We believe that the sovereign states of the Western Hemisphere, without interference from outside the Western

Hemisphere, must work together as good neighbors in the solution of their common problems.

We believe that full economic collaboration between all nations, great and small, is essential to the improvement of living conditions all over the world, and to the establishment of freedom from fear and freedom from want.

We shall continue to strive to promote freedom of expression and freedom of religion throughout the peace-loving areas of the world.

We are convinced that the preservation of peace between nations requires a United Nations Organization composed of all the peace-loving nations of the world who are willing jointly to use force, if necessary, to insure peace.

1947:

Progress in reaching our domestic goals is closely related to our conduct of foreign affairs. All that I have said about maintaining a sound and prosperous economy and improving the welfare of our people has greater meaning because of the world leadership of the United States. What we do, or fail to do, at home affects not only ourselves but millions throughout the world. If we are to fulfill our responsibilities to ourselves and to other peoples, we must make sure that the United States is sound economically, socially, and politically. Only then will we be able to help bring about the elements of peace in other countries -- political stability, economic advancement, and social progress.

During the long months of debate on these treaties, we have made it clear to all nations that the United States will not consent to settlements at the expense of principles we regard as vital to a just and enduring peace. We have made it equally clear that we will not retreat to isolationism. Our policies will be the same during the forthcoming negotiations in Moscow on the German and Austrian treaties, and during future conferences on the Japanese treaty.

The delay in arriving at the first peace settlements is due partly to the difficulty of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on their terms of settlement. Whatever differences there may have been between us and the Soviet Union, however, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the basic interests of both nations lie in the early making of a peace under which the peoples of all countries may return, as free men and women, to the essential tasks of production and reconstruction. The major concern of each of us should be the promotion of collective security, not the advancement of individual security.

We must now get on with the peace settlements. The occupying powers should recognize the independence of Austria and withdraw their troops. The Germans and the Japanese cannot be left in doubt and fear as to their

future; they must know their national boundaries, their resources, and what reparations they must pay. Without trying to manage their internal affairs, we can insure that those countries do not rearm.

1948:

Our fifth goal is to achieve world peace based on principles of freedom and justice and the equality of all nations.

Twice within our generation, world wars have taught us that we cannot isolate ourselves from the rest of the world.

We have learned that the loss of freedom in any area of the world means a loss of freedom to ourselves -- that the loss of independence by any nation adds directly to the insecurity of the United States and all free nations.

We have learned that a healthy world economy is essential to world peace -- that economic distress is a disease whose evil effects spread far beyond the boundaries of the afflicted nation.

For these reasons the United States is vigorously following policies designed to achieve a peaceful and prosperous world.

We are giving, and will continue to give, our full support to the United Nations. While that organization has encountered unforeseen and unwelcome difficulties, I am confident of its ultimate success. We are also devoting our efforts toward world economic recovery and the revival of world trade. These actions are closely related and mutually supporting.

We believe that the United States can be an effective force for world peace only if it is strong. We look forward to the day when nations will decrease their armaments; yet, so long as there remains serious opposition to the ideals of a peaceful world, we must maintain strong armed forces.

The passage of the National security Act by the Congress at its last session was a notable step in providing for the security of this country. A further step which I consider of even greater importance is the early provision for universal training. There are many elements in a balanced national security program, all interrelated and necessary, but universal training should be the foundation for them all. A favorable decision by the Congress at an early date is of world importance. I am convinced that such action is vital to the security of this Nation and to the maintenance of its leadership.

The United States is engaged today in many international activities directed toward the creation of lasting peaceful relationships among nations.

We have been giving substantial aid to Greece and Turkey to assist these nations in preserving their integrity against foreign pressures. Had it not been for our aid, their situation today might well be radically different.

The continued integrity of those countries will have a powerful effect upon other nations in the Middle East and Europe struggling to maintain their independence while they repair the damages of war.

The United States has special responsibilities with respect to the countries in which we have occupation forces: Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea. Our efforts to reach agreements on peace settlements for these countries have so far been blocked, but we shall continue to exert our utmost efforts to obtain satisfactory settlements for each of these nations.

Many thousands of displaced persons, still living in camps overseas, should be allowed entry into the United States. I again urge the Congress to pass suitable legislation at once so that this Nation may do its share in caring for homeless and suffering refugees of all faiths. I believe that the admission of these persons will add to the strength and energy of this Nation.

We are moving toward our goal of world peace in many ways, but the most important efforts which we are now making are those which support world economic reconstruction. We are seeking to restore the world trading system which was shattered by the war and to remedy the economic paralysis which grips many countries.

1949:

We are following a foreign policy which is the outward expression of the democratic faith we profess. We are doing what we can to encourage free states and free peoples throughout the world, to aid the suffering and afflicted in foreign lands, and to strengthen democratic nations against aggression.

The heart of our foreign policy is peace. We are supporting a world organization to keep peace and a world economic policy to create prosperity for mankind. Our guiding star is the principle of international cooperation. To this concept we have made a national commitment as profound as anything in history. To it we have pledged our resources and our honor.

Until a system of world security is established upon which we can safely rely, we cannot escape the burden of creating and maintaining armed forces sufficient to deter aggression. We have made great progress in the last year in the effective organization of our armed forces, but further improvements in our national security legislation are necessary. Universal training is essential to the security of the United States.



1950:

During the past year we have made notable progress in strengthening the foundations of peace and freedom, abroad and at home.

We have taken important steps in securing the North Atlantic community against aggression. We have continued our successful support of European recovery. We have returned to our established policy of expanding international trade through reciprocal agreement. We have strengthened our support of the United Nations.

While great problems still confront us, the greatest danger has receded -- the possibility which faced us 3 years ago that most of Europe and the Mediterranean area might collapse under totalitarian pressure. Today, the free peoples of the world have new vigor and new hope for the cause of peace.

Among all the great changes that have occurred in the last 50 years, none is more important than the change in the position of the United States in world affairs. Fifty years ago we were a country devoted largely to our own internal affairs. Our industry was growing, and we had new interests in the Far East and in the Caribbean, but we were primarily concerned with the development of vast areas of our own continental territory.

Our tremendous strength has brought with it tremendous responsibilities. We have moved from the outer edge to the center of world affairs. Other nations look to us for a wise exercise of our economic and military strength, and for vigorous support of the ideals of representative government and a free society. We will not fail them.

Our objective in the world is peace. Our country has joined with others in the task of achieving peace. We know now that this is not an easy task, or a short one. But we are determined to see it through. Both of our great political parties are committed to working together -- and I am sure they will continue to work together -- to achieve this end. We are prepared to devote our energy and our resources to this task, because we know that our own security and the future of mankind are at stake.

Our success in working with other nations to achieve peace depends largely on what we do at home. We must preserve our national strength. Strength is not simply a matter of arms and force. It is a matter of economic growth, and social health, and vigorous institutions, public and private. We can achieve peace only if we maintain our productive energy, our democratic institutions, and our firm belief in individual freedom.

In foreign polity they mean that we can never be tolerant of oppression or tyranny. They mean that we must throw our weight on the side of greater freedom and a better life for all peoples. These principles confirm us in

carrying out the specific programs for peace which we have already begun.

We shall continue to give our wholehearted support to the United Nations. We believe that this organization can ultimately provide the framework of international law and morality without which mankind cannot survive. It has already set up new standards for the conduct of nations in the Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on Genocide. It is moving ahead to give meaning to the concept of world brotherhood through a wide variety of cultural, economic, and technical activities.

Our aim for a peaceful, democratic world of free peoples will be achieved in the long run, not by force of arms, but by an appeal to the minds and hearts of men. If the peace policy of the democratic nations is to be successful, they must demonstrate that the benefits of their way of life can be increased and extended to all nations and all races.

In the world today we are confronted with the danger that the rising demand of people everywhere for freedom and a better life may be corrupted and betrayed by the false promises of communism. In its ruthless struggle for power, communism seizes upon our imperfections, and takes advantage of the delays and set-backs which the democratic nations experience in their effort to secure a better life for their citizens. This challenge to us is more than a military challenge. It is a challenge to the honesty of our profession of the democratic faith; it is a challenge to the efficiency and stability of our economic system; it is a challenge to our willingness to work with other peoples for world peace and world prosperity.

1951:

Our men are fighting, alongside their United Nations allies, because they know, as we do, that the aggression in Korea is part of the attempt of the Russian Communist dictatorship to take over the world, step by step.

Our men are fighting a long way from home, but they are fighting for our lives and our liberties. They are fighting to protect our right to meet here today -- our right to govern ourselves as a free nation.

The threat of world conquest by Soviet Russia endangers our liberty and endangers the kind of world in which the free spirit of man can survive. This threat is aimed at all peoples who strive to win or defend their own freedom and national independence.

Indeed, the state of our Nation is in great part the state of our friends and allies throughout the world. The gun that points at them points at us also.

The present rulers of the Soviet Union have shown that they are willing to use this power to destroy the free nations and win domination over the whole world.

Our own national security is deeply involved with that of the other free nations. While they need our support, we equally need theirs. Our national safety would be gravely prejudiced if the Soviet Union were to succeed in harnessing to its war machine the resources and the manpower of the free nations on the borders of its empire.

Strategically, economically, and morally the defense of Europe is part of our own defense.

That is why we have joined with the countries of Europe in the North Atlantic Treaty, pledging ourselves to work with them.

As for the third part of our program, we will continue to work for peaceful settlements of international disputes. We will support the United Nations and remain loyal to the great principles of international cooperation laid down in its Charter.

We are willing, as we have always been, to negotiate honorable settlements with the Soviet Union. But we will not engage in appeasement.

1952:

We are moving through a perilous time. Faced with a terrible threat of aggression, our Nation has embarked upon a great effort to help establish the kind of world in which peace shall be secure. Peace is our goal -- not peace at any price, but a peace based on freedom and justice. We are now in the midst of our effort to reach that goal. On the whole, we have been doing very well.

Peace depends upon the free nations sticking together, and making a combined effort to check aggression and prevent war. In this respect 1951 was a year of great achievement.

The action of the United Nations in Korea has been a powerful deterrent to a third world war. However, the situation in Korea remains very hazardous. The outcome of the armistice negotiations is still uncertain.

In Indochina and Malaya our aid has helped our allies to hold back the Communist advance, although there are signs of further trouble in that area.

In 1951 we strengthened the chances of peace in the Pacific region by the treaties with Japan and by defense arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.

In Europe combined defense has become a reality. The free nations have created a real fighting force. This force is not yet as strong as it needs to be; but it is already a real obstacle to any attempt by hostile forces to sweep across Europe to the Atlantic.

In 1951 we also moved to strengthen the security of Europe by the agreement to bring Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty.

The United Nations, the world's great hope for peace, has come through a year of trial stronger and more useful

than ever. The free nations have stood together in blocking Communist attempts to tear up the Charter.

At the present session of the United Nations in Paris, we, together with the British and the French, offered a plan to reduce and control all armaments under a foolproof inspection system. This is a concrete, practical proposal for disarmament.

Disarmament is not a joke. Vishinsky's laughter met with shock and anger from people all over the world. And, as a result, Mr Stalin's representative received orders to stop laughing and start talking.

If the Soviet leaders were to accept this proposal, it would lighten the burden of armaments and permit the resources of the earth to be devoted to the good of mankind. But until the Soviet Union accepts a sound disarmament proposal, and joins in peaceful settlements, we have no choice except to build up our defenses.

During this past year we added more than a million men and women to our Armed Forces. The total is now nearly 3 1/2 million. We have made rapid progress in the field of atomic weapons. We have turned out 16 billion dollars worth of military supplies and equipment, three times as much as the year before.

The outstanding fact to note on the debit side of the ledger is that the Soviet Union in 1951 continued to expand its military production and increase its already excessive military power.

Nevertheless, the grim fact remains that the Soviet Union is increasing its armed might. It is still producing more war planes than the free nations. It has set off two more atomic explosions. The world still walks in the shadow of another world war.

Taking the good and bad together, we have made real progress this last year along the road to peace. We have increased the power and unity of the free world. And, while we were doing this, we have avoided world war on the one hand and appeasement on the other. This is a hard road to follow, but the events of the last year show that is the right road to peace.

Our task will not be easy; but, if we go at it with a will, we can look forward to steady progress. On our side are all the great resources of freedom; the ideals of religion and democracy, the aspiration of people for a better life, and the industrial and technical power of a free civilization.

These advantages outweigh anything the slave world can produce. The only thing that can defeat us is our own state of mind. We can lose if we falter.

But if there are any among us who think we ought to ease up in the fight for peace, I want to remind them of three things -- just three things.

First: The threat of world war is still very real. We had one Pearl Harbor; let's not get caught off guard again.

If you don't think the threat of Communist armies is real, talk to some of our men back from Korea.

Second: If the United States had to try to stand alone against a Soviet-dominated world, it would destroy the life we know and the ideals we hold dear. Our allies are essential to us, just as we are essential to them. The more shoulders there are to bear the burden the lighter it will be.

Third: The things we believe in most deeply are under relentless attack. We have the great responsibility of saving the basic moral and spiritual values of our civilization. We have started out well, with a program for peace that is unparalleled in history. If we believe in ourselves and the faith we profess, we will stick to the job.

In Asia the new Communist empire is a daily threat to millions of people. The peoples of Asia want to be free to follow their own way of life. They want to preserve their culture and their traditions against communism just as much as we want to preserve ours. They are laboring under terrific handicaps: poverty, ill health, feudal systems of land ownership, and the threat of internal subversion or external attack. We can and must increase our help to them.

That mean military aid, especially to those places like Indochina, which might be hardest hit by some new Communist attack.

During the coming year we must not forget the suffering of the people who live behind the iron curtain. In those areas minorities are being oppressed, human rights violated, religion persecuted. We should continue to expose those wrongs. We should continue and expand the activities of the Voice of America, which brings our message of hope and truth to those peoples and other peoples throughout the world.

1953 (first speech):

But our times are not easy; they are hard -- as hard and complex, perhaps, as any in our history. Now the President not only has to carry on these tasks in such a way that our democracy may grow and flourish and our people prosper, but he also has to lead the whole free world in overcoming the Communist menace -- and all this under the shadow of the atomic bomb.

The Second World War radically changed the power relationships of the world. Nations once great were left shattered and weak; channels of communication, routes of trade, political and economic ties of many kinds were ripped apart.

And in this changed, disrupted, chaotic situation, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two strongest powers of the world. Each had tremendous human

and natural resources, actual or potential, on a scale unmatched by any other nation.

Nothing could make plainer why the world is in its present state -- and how that came to pass -- than an understanding of the diametrically opposite principles and policies of these two great powers in a war-ruined world.

It is a struggle as old as recorded history; it is freedom versus tyranny.

For the dominant idea of the Soviet regime is the terrible conception that men do not have rights but live at the mercy of the state.

Inevitably this idea of theirs -- and all the consequences flowing from it -- collided with the efforts of free nations to build a just and peaceful world. The "cold war" between the Communists and the free world is nothing more or less than the Soviet attempt to checkmate and defeat our peaceful purposes, in furtherance of their own dread objective.

The world is divided, not through our fault or failure, but by Soviet design. They, not we, began the cold war. And because the free world saw this happen -- because men know we made the effort and the Soviet rulers spurned it -- the free nations have accepted leadership from our Republic in meeting and mastering the Soviet offensive.

From 1945 to 1949 the United States was sole possessor of the atomic bomb. That was a great deterrent and protection in itself.

But when the Soviets produced an atomic explosion -- as they were bound to do in time -- we had to broaden the whole basis of our strength. We had to endeavor to keep our lead in atomic weapons. We had to strengthen our Armed Forces generally and to enlarge our productive capacity -- or mobilization base. Historically, it was the Soviet atomic explosion in the fall of 1949, 9 months before the aggression in Korea, which stimulated the planning for our program of defense mobilization.

For now we have entered the atomic age, and war has undergone a technological change which makes it a very different thing from what it used to be. War today between the Soviet Empire and the free nations might dig the grave not only of our Stalinist opponents but of our own society, our world as well as theirs.

The war of the future would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one blow, demolish the great cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past -- and destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations.

Such a war is not a possible policy for rational man. We know this, but we dare not assume that others would not yield to the temptation science is now placing in their hands.

1953 (second speech):

Our country has come through a painful period of trial and disillusionment since the victory of 1945. We anticipated a world of peace and cooperation. The calculated pressures of aggressive communism have forced us, instead, to live in a world of turmoil.

From this costly experience we have learned one clear lesson. We have learned that the free world cannot indefinitely remain in a posture of paralyzed tension. To do so leaves forever to the aggressor the choice of time and place and means to cause greatest hurt to us at least cost to himself.

This administration has, therefore, begun the definition of a new, positive foreign policy. This policy will be governed by certain basic ideas. They are these:

First. Our foreign policy must be clear, consistent, and confident. This means that it must be the product of genuine, continuous cooperation between the executive and the legislative branches of this Government. It must be developed and directed in the spirit of true bipartisanship. And I assure you, Members of this Congress, I mean that fully, earnestly, and sincerely.

Second. The policy we embrace must be a coherent global policy. The freedom we cherish and defend in Europe and in the Americas is no different from the freedom that is imperiled in Asia.

Third. Our policy, dedicated to making the free world secure, will envision all peaceful methods and devices -- except breaking faith with our friends. We shall never acquiesce in the enslavement of any people in order to purchase fancied gain for ourselves. I shall ask the Congress at a later date to join in an appropriate resolution making clear that this Government recognizes no kind of commitment contained in secret understandings of the past with foreign governments which permit this kind of enslavement.

Fourth. The policy we pursue will recognize the truth that no single country, even one so powerful as ours, can alone defend the liberty of all nations threatened by Communist aggression from without or subversion within. Mutual security means effective mutual cooperation. For the United States, this means that, as a matter of common sense and national interest, we shall give help to other nations in the measure that they strive earnestly to do their full share of the common task. No wealth of aid could compensate for poverty of spirit. The heart of every free nation must be honestly dedicated to the preserving of its own independence and security.

Fifth. Our policy will be designed to foster the advent of practical unity in Western Europe. The nations of that region have contributed notably to the effort of sustaining the security of the free world. From the jungles

of Indochina and Malaya to the northern shores of Europe, they have made costly and bitter sacrifices to hold the line of freedom.

There is but one sure way to avoid global war -- and that is to win the cold war.

While retaliatory power is one strong deterrent to a would-be aggressor, another powerful deterrent is defensive power. No enemy is likely to attempt an attack foredoomed to failure.

Because the building of a completely impenetrable defense against attack is still not possible, total defensive strength must include civil defense preparedness. Because we have incontrovertible evidence that Soviet Russia possesses atomic weapons, this kind of protection becomes sheer necessity.

1954:

American freedom is threatened so long as the world Communist conspiracy exists in its present scope, power, and hostility. More closely than ever before, American freedom is interlocked with the freedom of other people. In the unity of the free world lies our best chance to reduce the Communist threat without war. In the task of maintaining this unity and strengthening all its parts, the greatest responsibility falls naturally on those who, like ourselves, retain the most freedom and strength.

We shall, therefore, continue to advance the cause of freedom on foreign fronts.

In the Far East we retain our vital interest in Korea. We have negotiated with the Republic of Korea a mutual security pact, which develops our security system for the Pacific and which I shall promptly submit to the Senate for its consent to ratification. We are prepared to meet any renewal of armed aggression in Korea. We shall maintain indefinitely our bases in Okinawa. I shall ask the Congress to authorize continued material assistance to hasten the successful conclusion of the struggle in Indochina. This assistance will also bring closer the day when the Associated States may enjoy the independence already assured by France. We shall also continue military and economic aid to the Nationalist Government of China.

In the Middle East, where tensions and serious problems exist, we will show sympathetic and impartial friendship.

In Western Europe our policy rests firmly on the North Atlantic Treaty. It will remain so based as far ahead as we can see. Within its organization, the building of a united European community, including France and Germany, is vital to a free and self-reliant Europe. This will be promoted by the European Defense Community which offers assurance of European security. With the coming of unity to Western Europe, the assistance this Nation can render for the



security of Europe and the free world will be multiplied in effectiveness.

In the world as a whole, the United Nations, admittedly still in a state of evolution, means much to the United States. It has given uniquely valuable services in many places where violence threatened. It is the only real world forum where we have the opportunity for international presentation and rebuttal. It is a place where the nations of the world can, if they have the will, take collective action for peace and justice. It is a place where the guilt can be squarely assigned to those who fail to take all necessary steps to keep the peace. The United Nations deserves our continued firm support.

First, while determined to use atomic power to serve the usages of peace, we take into full account our great and growing number of nuclear weapons and the most effective means of using them against an aggressor if they are needed to preserve our freedom. Our defense will be stronger if, under appropriate security safeguard, we share with our allies certain knowledge of the tactical use of our nuclear weapons. I urge the Congress to provide the needed authority.

1955:

Under the auspices of the United Nations, there is promise of progress in our country's plan for the peaceful use of atomic energy.

Finally, today the world is at peace. It is, to be sure, an insecure peace. Yet all humanity finds hope in the simple fact that for an appreciable time there has been no active battlefield on earth. This same fact inspires us to work all the more effectively with other nations for the well-being, the freedom, the dignity, of every human on earth. In the ultimate achievement of this great purpose lies the only sure promise of security and permanent peace for any nation, including our own.

These developments are heartening. But sobering problems remain.

The massive military machines and ambitions of the Soviet-Communist bloc still create uneasiness in the world. All of us are aware of the continuing reliance of the Soviet Communists on military force, of the power of their weapons, of their present resistance to realistic armament limitation, and of their continuing effort to dominate or intimidate free nations on their periphery. Their steadily growing power includes an increasing strength in nuclear weapons. This power, combined with the proclaimed intentions of the Communist leaders to communize the world, is the threat confronting us today.

To protect our nations and our peoples from the catastrophe of a nuclear holocaust, free nations must maintain countervailing military power to persuade to

Communists of the futility of seeking to advance their ends through aggression. If Communist rulers understand that America's response to aggression will be swift and decisive -- that never shall we buy peace at the expense of honor or faith -- they will be powerfully deterred from launching a military venture engulfing their own peoples and many others in disaster. Now this, of course, is a form of world stalemate. But in this stalemate each of us -- every American -- may and must exercise his high duty to strive in every honorable way for enduring peace.

The military threat is but on menace to our freedom and security. We must not only deter aggression; we must also frustrate the effort of Communists to gain their goals by subversion. To this end, free nations must maintain and reinforce their cohesion, their internal security, their political and economic vitality, and their faith in freedom.

In such a world, America's course is clear:

We must strengthen the collective defense under the United Nations Charter and gird ourselves with sufficient military strength and productive capacity to discourage resort to war and protect our Nation's vital interests.

We must continue to support and strengthen the United Nations. At this moment, by vote of the United Nations General Assembly, its Secretary General is in Communist China on a mission of deepest concern to all Americans: seeking the release of our never-to-be-forgotten American aviators and all other United Nations prisoners wrongfully detained by the Communist regime.

We must also encourage the efforts being made in the United Nations to limit armaments and to harness the atom to peaceful use.

We must expand international trade and investment and assist friendly nations whose own best efforts are still insufficient to provide the strength essential to the security of the free world.

We must be willing to use the processes of negotiation whenever they will advance the cause of just and secure peace.

Fourth, pending a world agreement on armament limitation, we must continue to expand our supplies of nuclear weapons for our land, naval, and air forces. We shall continue our encouraging progress, at the same time, in the peaceful use of atomic power.

1956:

Our world policy and our actions are dedicated to the achievement of peace with justice for all nations.

With this purpose, we move in a wide variety of ways and through many agencies to remove the pall of fear; to strengthen the ties with our partners and to improve the cooperative cohesion of the free world; to reduce the burden of armaments; and to stimulate and inspire action among all

nations for a world of justice and prosperity and peace. These national objectives are fully supported by both our political parties.

All were in agreement that a nuclear war would be an intolerable disaster which must not be permitted to occur. But in October, when the Foreign Ministers met again, the results demonstrated conclusively that the Soviet leaders are not yet willing to create the indispensable conditions for a secure and lasting peace.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the conflict between international communism and freedom has taken on a new complexion.

We know the Communist leaders have often practiced the tactics of retreat and zigzag. We know that soviet and Chinese communism still poses a serious threat to the free world. And in the Middle East recent Soviet moves are hardly compatible with the reduction of international tension.

Yet Communist tactics against the free nations have shifted in emphasis from reliance on violence and the threat of violence to reliance on division, enticement, and duplicity. We must be well prepared to meet the current tactics which pose a dangerous though less obvious threat. At the same time, our policy must be dynamic as well as flexible, designed primarily to forward the achievement of our own objectives rather than to meet each shift and change on the Communist front. We must act in the firm assurance that the fruits of freedom are more attractive and desirable to mankind in the pursuit of happiness than the record of communism.

In the face of Communist military power, we must, of course, continue to maintain an effective system of collective security. This involves two things -- a system which gives clear warning that armed aggression will be met by joint action of the free nations, and deterrent military power to make that warning effective. Moreover, the awesome power of the atom must be made to serve as a guardian of the free community and of the peace.

1957:

The existence of a strongly armed imperialistic dictatorship poses a continuing threat to the free world's and thus to our own Nation's security and peace. There are certain truths to be remembered here.

First, America alone and isolated cannot assure even its own security. We must be joined by the capability and resolution of nations that have proved themselves dependable defenders of freedom. Isolation from them invites war. Our security is also enhanced by the immeasurable interest that joins us with all peoples who believe that peace with justice must be preserved, that wars of aggression are crimes against humanity.

Another truth is that our survival in today's world requires modern, adequate, dependable military strength. Our Nation has made great strides in assuring a modern defense, so armed in new weapons, so deployed, so equipped, that today our security force is the most powerful in our peacetime history. It can punish heavily any enemy who undertakes to attack us. It is a major deterrent to war.

A sound and safeguarded agreement for open skies, unarmed aerial sentinels, and reduced armament would provide a valuable contribution toward a durable peace in the years ahead. And we have been persistent in our efforts to reach such an agreement. We are willing to enter any reliable agreement which would reverse the trend toward ever more devastating nuclear weapons; reciprocally provide against the possibility of surprise attack; mutually control the outer-space missile and satellite development; and make feasible a lower level of armaments and armed forces and an easier burden of military expenditures. Our continuing negotiations in this field are a major part of our quest for a confident peace in this atomic age.

1958:

As to our strength, I have repeatedly voiced this conviction: We now have a broadly based and efficient defensive strength, including a great deterrent power, which is, for the present, our main guaranty against war; but, unless we act wisely and promptly, we could lose that capacity to deter attack or defend ourselves.

My profoundest conviction is that the American people will say, as one man: No matter what the exertions or sacrifices, we shall maintain that necessary strength.

But we could make no more tragic mistake than merely to concentrate on military strength.

For if we did only this, the future would hold nothing for the world but an age of terror.

And so our second task is to do the constructive work of building a genuine peace. We must never become so preoccupied with our desire for military strength that we neglect those areas of economic development, trade, diplomacy, education, ideas, and principles where the foundations of real peace must be laid.

The threat to our safety, and to the hope of a peaceful world, can be simply stated. It is Communist imperialism.

This threat is not something imagined by critics of the Soviets. Soviet spokesmen, from the beginning, have publicly and frequently declared their aim to expand their power, one way or another, throughout the world.

The threat has become increasingly serious as this expansionist aim has been reinforced by an advancing industrial, military, and scientific establishment.

But what makes the Soviet threat unique in history is its all-inclusiveness. Every human activity is pressed into

service as a weapon of expansion. Trade, economic development, military power, arts, science, education, the whole world of ideas -- all are harnessed to this same chariot of expansion.

The Soviets are, in short, waging total cold war.

The only answer to a regime that wages total cold war is to wage total peace.

This means bringing to bear every asset of our personal and national lives upon the task of building the conditions in which security and peace can grow.

1959:

We cannot build peace through desire alone. Moreover, we have learned the bitter lesson that international agreements, historically considered by us as sacred, are regarded in Communist doctrine and in practice to be mere scraps of paper. The most recent proof of their disdain of international obligations, solemnly undertaken, is their announced intention to abandon their responsibilities respecting Berlin.

As a consequence of these actions we can have no confidence in any treaty to which Communists are a party except where such a treaty provides within itself for self-enforcing mechanisms. Indeed, the demonstrated disregard of the Communists of their own pledges is one of the greatest obstacles to world success in substituting the rule of law for rule by force.

To achieve this peace we seek to prevent war at any place and in any dimension. If, despite our best efforts, a local dispute should flare into armed hostilities, the next problem would be to keep the conflict from spreading, and so compromising freedom. In support of these objectives we maintain forces of great power and flexibility.

Our own vast strength is only a part of that required for dependable security. Because of this we have joined with nearly 50 other nations in collective security arrangements. In these common undertakings each nation is expected to contribute what it can in sharing the heavy load. Each supplies part of a strategic deployment to protect the forward boundaries of freedom.

Our foreign policy has long been dedicated to building a permanent and just peace.

1960:

First, I point out that for us, annual self-examination is made a definite necessity by the fact that we now live in a divided world of uneasy equilibrium, with our side committed to its own protection and against aggression by the other.

With both sections of this divided world in possession of unbelievably destructive weapons, mankind approaches a state where mutual annihilation becomes a possibility. No

other fact of today's world equals this in importance -- it colors everything we say, plan, and do.

There is demanded of us vigilance, determination, and the dedication of whatever portion of our resources that will provide adequate security, especially provide a real deterrent to aggression. These things we are doing.

Over the past year the Soviet Union has expressed an interest in measures to reduce the common peril of war.

While neither we nor any other free world nation can permit ourselves to be misled by pleasant promises until they are tested by performance, yet we approach this apparently new opportunity with the utmost seriousness. We must strive to break the calamitous cycle of frustrations and crises which, if unchecked, could spiral into nuclear disaster; the ultimate insanity.

Through the need for dependable agreements to assure against resort to force in settling disputes is apparent to both sides yet as in other issues dividing men and nations, we cannot expect sudden and revolutionary results. But we must find some place to begin.

On obvious road on which to make a useful start is in the widening of communication between our two peoples. In this field there are, both sides willing, countless opportunities -- most of them well known to us all -- for developing mutual understanding, the true foundation of peace.

No matter how earnest is our quest for guaranteed peace, we must maintain a high degree of military effectiveness at the same time we are engaged in negotiating the issue of arms reduction. Until tangible and mutually enforceable arms reduction measures are worked out, we will not weaken the means of defending our institutions.

This year, moreover, growing numbers of nuclear-powered submarines will enter our active forces, some to be armed with Polaris missiles. These remarkable ships and weapons, ranging the oceans, will be capable of accurate fire on targets virtually anywhere on earth. Impossible to destroy by surprise attack, they will become one of our most effective sentinels for peace.

To meet situations of less than general nuclear war, we continue to maintain our carrier forces, our many service units abroad, our always ready Army strategic forces and Marine Corps divisions, and the civilian components. The continuing modernization of these forces is a costly but necessary process, and is scheduled to go forward at a rate which will steadily add to our strength.

1961 (first speech):

During the period, the United States has forged ahead under a constructive foreign policy. The continuing goal is peace, liberty, and well-being -- for others as well as ourselves. The aspirations of all peoples are one -- peace

with justice in freedom. Peace can only be attained collectively as peoples everywhere unite in their determination that liberty and well-being come to all mankind.

Yet while we have worked to advance national aspirations for freedom, a divisive force has been at work to divert that aspiration into dangerous channels. the Communist movement throughout the world exploits the natural striving of all to be free and attempts to subjugate men rather than free them. These activities have caused and are continuing to cause grave troubles in the world.

Since 1953, our defense policy has been based on the assumption that the international situation would require heavy defense expenditures for an indefinite period to come, probably for years. In this protracted struggle, good management dictates that we resist overspending as resolutely as we oppose underspending. Every dollar uselessly spent on military mechanisms decreases our total strength and, therefore, our security. We must not return to the crash program psychology of the past when each new feint by the Communists was responded to in panic. The "bomber gap" of several years ago was always a fiction, and the "missile gap" shows every sign of being the same.

The Nation can ill afford to abandon a national policy which provides for a fully adequate and steady level of effort, designed for the long pull; a fast adjustment to new scientific and technological advances; a balanced force of such strength as to deter general war, to effectively meet local situations and to retaliate to attack and destroy the attacker; and a strengthened system of free world collective security.

1961 (second speech):

Our greatest challenge is still the world that lies beyond the cold war -- but the first great obstacle is still our relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. We must never be lulled into believing that either power has yielded its ambitions for world domination -- ambitions which they forcefully restated only a short time ago. On the contrary, our task is to convince them that aggression and subversion will not be profitable routes to pursue those ends. Open and peaceful competition -- for prestige, for markets, for scientific achievement, even for men's minds -- is something else again. For if freedom and communism were to compete for man's allegiance in a world at peace, I would look to the future with ever increasing confidence.

1962:

At times our goal has been obscured by crisis or endangered by conflict -- but it draws sustenance from five basic sources of strength:

the moral and physical strength of the United States;  
the united strength of the Atlantic community;  
the regional strength of our hemispheric relations;  
the creative strength of our efforts in the new and developing nations; and  
the peace-keeping strength of the United Nations.

But arms alone are not enough to keep the peace -- it must be kept by men. Our instrument and our hope is the United Nations -- and I see little merit in the impatience of those who would abandon this imperfect world instrument because they dislike our imperfect world. For the troubles of a world organization is merely reflect the troubles of the world itself. And if the organization is weakened, these troubles can only increase. We may not always agree with every detailed action taken by every officer of the United Nations, or with every voting majority. But as an institution, it should have in the future, as it has had in the past since its inception, no stronger or more faithful member than the United States of America.

In 1961, the peace-keeping strength of the United Nations was reinforced. And those who preferred or predicted its demise, envisioning a troika in the seat of Hammarskjold -- or Red China inside the Assembly -- have seen instead a new vigor, under a new Secretary General and a fully independent Secretariat. In making plans for a new forum and principles on disarmament -- for peace-keeping in outer space -- for a decade of development effort -- the U.N. fulfilled its charter's lofty aims.

1963:

In the world beyond our borders, steady progress has been made in building a world of order. The people of West Berlin remain free and secure. A settlement, though still precarious, has been reached in Laos. The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in South Vietnam. The end of agony may be in sight in the Congo.

Turning to the world outside, it was only a few years ago -- in southeast Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, even in outer space -- that communism sought to convey the image of a unified, confident, and expanding empire, closing in on a sluggish America and a free world in disarray. But few people would hold to that picture today.

In these past months, we have reaffirmed the scientific and military superiority of freedom. We have doubled our efforts in space, to assure us of being first in the future. We have undertaken the most far-reaching defense improvements in the peacetime history of this country. And we have maintained the frontiers of freedom from Vietnam to West Berlin.



But complacency or self-congratulation can imperil our security as much as the weapons of our adversary. A moment of pause is not a promise of peace. Dangerous problems remain from Cuba to the South China Sea. The world's prognosis prescribes not a year's vacation, but a year of obligation and opportunity.

Four special avenues of opportunity stand out: The Atlantic alliance, the developing nations, the new Sino-Soviet difficulties, and the search for worldwide peace.

Second, what of the developing and nonaligned nations? They were shocked by the Soviets' sudden and secret attempt to transform Cuba into a nuclear striking base, and by Communist China's arrogant invasion of India. They have been reassured by our prompt assistance to India, by our support through the United Nations of the Congo's unification, by our patient search for disarmament, and by the improvement in our treatment of citizen and visitors whose skins do not happen to be white. And as the older colonialism recedes, and the neocolonialism of the Communist Powers stands out more starkly than ever, they realize more clearly that the issue in the world struggle is not communism versus capitalism, but coercion versus free choice.

Third, what comfort can we take from the increasing strains and tensions within the Communist bloc? Here hope must be tempered with caution. For the Soviet-Chinese disagreement is over means, not ends. A dispute over how to bury the West is no grounds for Western rejoicing.

Finally, what can we do to move from the present pause toward enduring peace? Again I would counsel caution. I foresee no spectacular reversal in Communist methods or goals. But if all these trends and developments can persuade the Soviet Union to walk the path of peace, then let her know that all free nations will join with her. But until that choice is made, and until the world can develop a reliable system of international security, the free peoples have no choice but to keep their arms near.

1964:

First, we must maintain -- and our reduced defense budget will maintain -- that margin of military safety and superiority obtained through 3 years of steadily increasing both the quality and the quantity of our strategic, our conventional, and our antiguerrilla forces. In 1964 we will be better prepared than ever before to defend the cause of freedom -- whether it is threatened by outright aggression or by the infiltration practiced by those in Hanoi and Havana who ship arms and men across international borders to foment insurrection. And we must continue to use that strength, as John Kennedy used it in the Cuban crisis and for the test ban treaty, to demonstrate both the futility of nuclear war and the possibilities of lasting peace.

Second, we must take new steps -- and we shall make new proposals at Geneva -- toward the control and the eventual abolition of arms. Even in the absence of agreement we must not stockpile arms beyond our needs or seek an excess of military power that could be provocative as well as wasteful.

Ninth, we must strengthen our Atlantic and Pacific partnerships, maintain our alliances, and make the United Nations a more effective instrument for national independence and international order.

Tenth, and finally, we must develop with our allies new means of bridging the gap between the East and the West, facing danger boldly wherever danger exists, but being equally bold in our search for new agreements which can enlarge the hopes of all while violating the interests of none.

1965:

We are prepared to live as good neighbors with all, but we cannot be indifferent to acts designed to injure our interests, our citizens, or our establishments abroad. The community of nations requires mutual respect. We shall extend it -- and we shall expect it.

In our relations with the world we shall follow the example of Andrew Jackson who said: "I intend to ask for nothing that is not clearly right and to submit to nothing that is wrong." And he promised, "the honor of my country shall never be stained by an apology from me for the statement of truth or the performance of duty." That was our policy in the 1830's and that is our policy today.

Our own freedom and growth have never been the final goal of the American dream.

We were never meant to be an oasis of liberty and abundance in a worldwide desert of disappointed dreams. Our Nation was created to help strike away the chains of ignorance and misery and tyranny wherever they keep man less than God means him to be.

We are moving toward that destiny, never more rapidly than in the last 4 years.

Yet we still live in a troubled and perilous world. There is no longer a single threat. There are many. They differ in intensity and danger. They require different attitudes and different answers.

With the Soviet Union we seek peaceful understandings that can lessen the danger the freedom.

1966:

Our Nation tonight is now engaged in a brutal and bitter conflict in Vietnam. Later on I want to discuss that struggle in some detail with you. It just must be the center of our concerns. But we will not permit those who

fire upon us in Vietnam to win a victory over the desires and the intentions of all of the American people. This Nation is mighty enough, its society is healthy enough, its people are strong enough to pursue our goals in the rest of the world while still building a great society here at home. And that is what I have come here to ask of you tonight.

I recommend that you make it possible to expand trade between the United States and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Tonight the cup of peril is full in Vietnam.

That conflict is not an isolated episode, but another great event in the policy that we have followed with strong consistency since World War II.

The touchstone of that policy is the interest of the United States. But nations sink when they see that interest only through a narrow glass.

In a world that has grown small and dangerous, pursuit of narrow aims could bring decay and even disaster.

An America that is mighty beyond description, yet living in a hostile or despairing world, would be neither safe nor free to build a civilization to liberate the spirit of man.

In this pursuit we helped rebuild Western Europe. We gave our aid to Greece and Turkey, and we defended the freedom of Berlin.

In this pursuit we have helped new nations toward independence, we have extended a helping hand to the Peace Corps and carried forward the largest program of economic assistance in the world.

In this pursuit we worked to build a hemisphere of democracy and of social justice.

In this pursuit we have defended against Communist aggression -- in Korea under President Truman, in the Formosa Straits under President Eisenhower, in Cuba under President Kennedy, and again in Vietnam.

We will vigorously pursue existing proposals -- and seek new ones -- to control arms and stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

We will take new steps this year to help strengthen the Alliance for Progress, the unity of Europe, the community of the Atlantic, the regional organizations of developing continents, and that supreme association, the United Nations.

The fifth and most important principle of our foreign policy is support of national independence, the right of each people to govern themselves and to shape their own institutions.

For a peaceful world order will be possible only when each country walks the way that it has chosen to walk for itself.

We follow this principle by encouraging the end of colonial rule.

We follow this principle abroad as well as at home by continued hostility to the rule of the many by the few, or the oppression of one race by another.

We follow this principle by building bridges to Eastern Europe. I will ask the Congress for authority to remove the special tariff restrictions which are a barrier to increasing trade between the East and the West.

The insistent urge toward national independence is the strongest force of today's world in which we live.

We will stay because in Asia and around the world are countries whose independence rests in large measure on confidence in America's word and in America's protection. To yield to force in Vietnam would weaken that confidence, would undermine the independence of many lands, and would whet the appetite of aggression. We would have to fight in one land and then we would have to fight in another or abandon much of Asia to the domination of Communists.

We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military alliance in Vietnam. We fight for the principle of self-determination that the people of South Vietnam should be able to choose their own course, choose it in free elections without violence, without terror, and without fear. The people of all Vietnam should make a free decision on the great question of reunification.

1967:

Abroad, the question is whether we have the staying power to fight a very costly war, when the objective is limited and the danger to us is seemingly remote.

So our test is not whether we shrink from our country's cause when the dangers to us are obvious and close at hand, but, rather, whether we carry on when they seem obscure and distant -- and some think it is safe to lay down our burdens.

I have come tonight to ask this Congress and this nation to resolve that issue to meet our commitments at home and abroad -- to continue to build a better America -- and to reaffirm this nation's allegiance to freedom.

Abroad, as at home, there is also risk in change. But abroad, as at home, there is greater risk in standing still. No part of our foreign policy is so sacred that it ever remains beyond review. We shall be flexible where conditions in the world change -- and where man's efforts can change them for the better.

We are in the midst of a great transition -- a transition from narrow nationalism to international partnership, from the harsh spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and threatened planet.

Together, I think, we must now move to strike down the barriers to full cooperation among the American nations and

to free the energies and resources of two great continents on behalf of all our citizens.

In the great subcontinent of South Asia live more than a sixth of the earth's population. Over the years we -- and others -- have invested very heavily in capital and food for the economic development of India and Pakistan.

We are not prepared to see our assistance wasted, however, in conflict. It must strengthen their capacity to help themselves. It must help these two nations -- both our friends -- to overcome poverty, to merge as self-reliant leaders, and find terms for reconciliation and cooperation.

In western Europe we shall maintain in NATO an integrated common defense. But we also look forward to the time when greater security can be achieved through measures of arms control and disarmament, and through other forms of practical agreement.

We are shaping a new future of enlarged partnership in nuclear affairs, in economic and technical cooperation, in trade negotiations, in political consultation, and in working together with the governments and peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are also in transition. We have avoided both the acts and the rhetoric of the cold war. When we have differed with the Soviet Union, or other nations, for that matter, I have tried to differ quietly and with courtesy, and without venom.

Our objective is not to continue to cold war, but to end it.

We have signed an agreement at the United Nations on the peaceful uses of outer space.

The Soviet Union has in the past year increased its long-range missile capabilities. It has begun to place near Moscow a limited antimissile defense. My first responsibility to our people is to assure that no nation can ever find it rational to launch a nuclear attack or to use its nuclear power as a credible threat against us or against our allies.

I would emphasize that that is why an important link between Russia and the United States is in our common interest, in arms control and in disarmament. We have the solemn duty to slow down the arms race between us, if that is at all possible, in both conventional and nuclear weapons and defenses. I thought we were making some progress in that direction the first few months I was in office. I realize that any additional race would impose on our peoples, and on all mankind, for that matter, an additional waste of resources with no gain in security to either side.

We are in Viet Nam because the United States of America and our allies are committed by the SEATO treaty to "act to meet the common danger" of aggression in Southeast Asia.

We are in Viet Nam because an international agreement signed by the United States, North Viet Nam and others in

1962 is being systematically violated by the Communists. That violations threatens the independence of all the small nations in Southeast Asia, and threatens the peace of the entire region and perhaps the world.

We are there because the people of South Viet Nam have as much right to remain non Communist -- if that is what they choose -- as North Viet Nam has to remain Communist.

We are there because the Congress has pledged by solemn vote to take all necessary measures to prevent further aggression.

We have chosen to fight a limited war in Viet Nam in an attempt to prevent a larger war -- a war almost certain to follow; if the Communists succeed in overrunning and taking over South Viet Nam by aggression and by force -- I believe, and I am supported by some authority, that if they are not checked now the world can expect to pay a greater price to check them later.

I think I reveal no secret when I tell you we are dealing with a stubborn adversary who is committed to the use of force and terror to settle political questions.

I wish I could report to you that the conflict is almost over. This I cannot do. We face more cost, more loss, and more agony. For the end is not yet. I cannot promise that it will come this year -- or come next year. Our adversary still believes, I think, tonight, that he can go on fighting longer than we can, and longer than we and our allies will be prepared to stand up and resist.

I must say to you that our pressure must be sustained -- and will be sustained -- until he realizes that the war he started is costing him more than he can ever gain.

I know of no strategy more likely to attain that end than the strategy of accumulating slowly, but inexorably, every kind of material resource -- of "laboriously teaching troops the very elements of their trade." That, and patience -- and I mean a great deal of patience.

1968:

Since I spoke to you last, the United States and the Soviet Union have taken several important steps toward the goal of international cooperation.

Because we believe that the nuclear danger must be narrowed, we have worked with the Soviet Union and with other nations to reach an agreement that will halt the spread of nuclear weapons. On the basis of communications from Ambassador Fisher in Geneva this afternoon, I am encouraged to believe that a draft treaty can be laid before the conference in Geneva in the very near future. I hope to be able to present that treaty to the Senate this year for the Senate's approval.

Serious differences still remain between us, yet in these relations we have made some progress since Vienna and the Berlin wall and the Cuban missile crisis. But despite

this progress we must maintain a military force that is capable of deterring any threat to this nation's security, whatever the mode of aggression. Our choice must not be confined to total war or to total acquiescence.

We have such a military force today, and we shall maintain it.

I wish with all of my heart that the expenditures that are necessary to build and to protect our power could all be devoted to the programs of peace, but until world conditions permit, and until peace is assured, America's bravest sons that wear our nation's uniform must continue to stand guard for all of us, as they gallantly do tonight in Viet Nam and other places in the world.

Yet neither great weapons nor individual courage can provide the conditions of peace.

For two decades America has committed itself against the tyranny of want and ignorance in the world that threatens the peace.

And we shall sustain that commitment.

1969:

The quest for durable peace, I think, has absorbed every Administration since the end of World War II. It has required us to seek a limitation of arms races not only among the super-powers, but among the smaller nations as well. We have joined in the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and the treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons in 1968.

This latter agreement -- the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- is now pending in the Senate and it has been pending there since last July. In my opinion, delay in ratifying it is not going to be helpful to the cause of peace. America took the lead in negotiating this treaty and America should now take steps to have it approved at the earliest possible date.

Until a way can be found to scale down the level of arms among the super-powers, mankind cannot view the future without fear and great apprehension. I believe that we should resume the talks with the Soviet Union about limiting offensive and defensive missile systems. I think they would already have been resumed except for Czechoslovakia and our election this year.

It was more than 20 years ago that we embarked on a program of trying to aid the developing nations. We knew then that we could not live in good conscience as a rich enclave on an earth that was seething in misery.

During these years there have been great advances made under our program, particularly against want and hunger, although we are disappointed at the appropriations last year. We thought they were woefully inadequate. This year I am asking for adequate funds for economic assistance in the hope that we can further peace throughout the world.

I think we must continue to support efforts in regional cooperation. Among those efforts, that of Western Europe has a very special place in America's concern.

The only course that is going to permit Europe to play the great world role that its resources permit is to go forward to unity. I think America remains ready to work with a United Europe, to work as a partner on the basis of equality.

For the future, the quest for peace requires

--that we maintain the liberal trade policies that have helped us become the leading nation in world trade;

--that we strengthen the international monetary system as an instrument of world prosperity; and

--that we seek areas of agreement with the Soviet Union where the interests of both nations and the interests of world peace are properly served.

The strained relationship between us and the world's leading Communist power has not ended -- especially in the light of the brutal invasion of Czechoslovakia. Totalitarianism is no less odious to us because we are able to reach some accommodation that reduces the danger of world catastrophe.

What we do, we do in the interest of peace in the world. We earnestly hope that time will bring a Russia that is less afraid of diversity of individual freedom.

1970:

The major immediate goal of our foreign policy is to bring an end to the war in Vietnam in a way that our generation will be remembered, no so much as the generation that suffered in war, but more for the fact that we had the courage and character to win the kind of a just peace that the next generation was able to keep.

We are making progress toward that goal.

The prospects for peace are far greater today than they were a year ago.

A major part of the credit for this development goes to the members of this Congress who, despite their differences on the conduct of the war, have overwhelmingly indicated their support of a just peace. By this action, you have completely demolished the enemy's hopes that they can gain in Washington the victory our fighting men have denied them in Vietnam.

No goal could be greater than to make the next generation the first in this century in which America was at peace with every nation in the world.

We have based our policies on an evaluation of the world as it is, not as it was twenty-five years ago at the end of World War II. Many of the policies which were necessary and right then are obsolete today.

Then, because of America's overwhelming military and economic strength, because of the weakness of other major



free world powers and the inability of scores of newly independent nations to defend -- or even govern -- themselves, America had to assume the major burden for the defense of freedom in the world.

In two wars, first in Korea and now in Vietnam, we furnished most of the money, most of the arms, most of the men to help others defend their freedom.

Today the great industrial nations of Europe, as well as Japan, have regained their economic strength, and the nations of Latin America -- and many of the nations who acquired their freedom from colonialism after World War II in Asia and Africa -- have a new sense of pride and dignity, and a determination to assume the responsibility for their own defense.

That is the basis of the doctrine I announced at Guam.

Neither the defense nor the development of other nations can be exclusively or primarily an American undertaking.

The nations of each part of the world should assume the primary responsibility for their own well-being; and they themselves should determine the terms of that well-being.

We shall be faithful to our treaty commitments, but we shall reduce our involvement and our presence in other nations' affairs.

To insist that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility; it is a sharing of responsibility.

And if we are to have peace in the last third of the Twentieth Century, a major factor will be the development of a new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I would not underestimate our differences, but we are moving with precision and purpose from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation.

Our negotiations on strategic arms limitations and in other areas will have far greater chance for success if both sides enter them motivated by mutual self-interest rather than naive sentimentality.

This is the same spirit with which we have resumed discussions with Communist China in our talks at Warsaw.

Our concern in our relations with both these nations is to avoid a catastrophic collision and to build a solid basis for peaceful settlement of our differences.

I would be the last to suggest that the road to peace is not difficult and dangerous, but I believe our new policies have contributed to the prospect that America may have the best chance since World War II to enjoy a generation of uninterrupted peace and that chance will be enormously increased if we continue to have a relationship between Congress and the Executive in which, despite differences in detail, where the security of America and the peace of mankind are concerned, we act not as Republicans, not as Democrats -- but as Americans.

1971:

This can be the Congress that helped us end the longest war in the nation's history, and end it in a way that will give us at last a genuine chance for a full generation of peace.

1972:

It is my hope that we can end this tragic conflict through negotiation. If we cannot, then we shall end it through Vietnamization. But end it we shall -- in a way which fulfills our commitment to the people of South Vietnam and which gives them the chance to choose their own future.

The American people have learned many lessons in the wake of Vietnam, some helpful and some dangerous. One important lesson is that we can best serve our own interests in the world by setting realistic limits on what we try to accomplish unilaterally. For the peace of the world will be more secure, and its progress more rapid, as more nations come to share more fully in the responsibilities for peace and for progress.

At the same time, to conclude that the United States should now withdraw from all or most of its international responsibilities would be to make a dangerous error. There has been a tendency among some to swing from one extreme to the other in the wake of Vietnam, from wanting to do too much in the world to wanting to do too little. We must resist this temptation to over-react. We must stop the swinging pendulum before it moves to an opposite position, and forge instead an attitude toward the world which is balanced and sensible and realistic.

America has an important role to play in international affairs, a great influence to exert for good. As we have throughout this century, we must continue our profound concern for advancing peace and freedom, by the most effective means possible, even as we shift somewhat our view of what means are most effective.

This is our policy:

We will maintain a nuclear deterrent adequate to meet any threat to the security of the United States or of our allies.

We will help other nations develop the capability of defending themselves.

We will faithfully honor all of our treaty commitments.

We will act to defend our interests whenever and wherever they are threatened any place in the world.

But where our interests or our treaty commitments are not involved our role will be limited.

We will not intervene militarily.

But we will use our influence to prevent war.

If war comes we will use our influence to try to stop it.

Once war is over we will do our share in helping to bind up the wounds of those who have participated in it.

The United States is not the world's policeman nor the keeper of its moral conscience. But -- whether we like it or not -- we still represent a force for stability in what has too often been an unstable world, a force for justice in a world which is too often unjust, a force for progress in a world which desperately needs to progress, a force for peace in a world that is weary of war.

1973:

The basic state of our Union today is sound, and full of promise. We enter 1973 economically strong, militarily secure and, most important of all, at peace after at long and trying war.

In the field of foreign policy, we must remember that a strong America -- an America whose word is believed and whose strength is respected -- is essential to continued peace and understanding in the world. The peace with honor we have achieved in Vietnam has strengthened this basic American credibility. We must act in such a way in coming years that this credibility will remain intact, and with it, the world stability of which it is so indispensable a part.

1974:

In the past five years, we have made more progress toward a lasting structure of peace in the world than in any comparable time in the Nation's history. We could not have made that progress if we had not maintained the military strength of America. Thomas Jefferson once observed that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. By the same token, and for the same reason, in today's world, the price of peace is a strong defense as far as the United States is concerned.

The question is not whether we can afford to maintain the necessary strengths of our defense, the question is whether we can afford not to maintain it, and the answer to that question is no. We must never allow America to become the second strongest nation in the world.

I do not say this with any sense of belligerence, because I recognize the fact that is recognized around the world. America's military strength has always been maintained to keep the peace, never to break it. It has always been used to defend freedom, never to destroy it. The world's peace as well as our own depends on our remaining as strong as we need to be as long as we need to be.

In this year of 1974 we will be negotiating with the Soviet Union to place further limits on strategic nuclear arms. Together with our allies, we will be negotiating with

the nations of the Warsaw Pact on mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe. We will continue our efforts to promote peaceful economic development in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia. And we will press for full compliance with the peace accords that brought an end to American fighting in Indochina, including particularly a provision that promised the fullest possible accounting for those Americans who are missing in action.

1975:

Now, let me turn, if I might, to the international dimension of the present crisis. At no time in our peacetime history has the state of the nation depended more heavily on the state of the world. And seldom if ever has the state of the world depended more heavily on the state of our nation.

This nation can be proud of significant achievements in recent years in solving problems and crises. The Berlin Agreement, the SALT agreements, our new relationship with China, the unprecedented efforts in the Middle East -- are immensely encouraging. But the world is not free from crisis. In a world of 150 nations, where nuclear technology is proliferating and regional conflicts continue, international security cannot be taken for granted.

So let there be no mistake about it: international cooperation is a vital factor of our lives today. This is not a moment for the American people to turn inward. More than ever before, our own well-being depends on America's determination and America's leadership in the whole wide world.

Our relations with the Communist countries are a basic factor of the world environment. We must seek to build a long-term basis for coexistence. We will stand by our principles. We will stand by our interests; we will act firmly when challenged. The kind of world we want depends on a broad policy of creating mutual incentives for restraint and for cooperation.

1976:

The protection of the lives and property of Americans from foreign enemies is one of my primary responsibilities as President.

Today, the state of our foreign policy is sound and strong.

We are at peace -- and I will do all in my power to keep it that way.

Our military forces are capable and ready; our military power is without equal. And I intend to keep it that way.

Our principle alliances, with the industrial democracies of the Atlantic Community and Japan, have never been more solid.

A further agreement to limit the strategic arms race may be achieved.

We have an improving relationship with China, the world's most populous nation.

The key elements for peace among the nations of the Middle East now exist.

Our traditional friendships in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, continue.

We have taken the role of leadership in launching a serious and hopeful dialogue between the industrial world and the developing world.

We have achieved significant reform of the international monetary system.

A strong defense posture gives weight to our values and our views in international negotiation, it assures the vigor of our alliances; and it sustains our efforts to promote settlements of international conflicts. Only from a position of strength can we negotiate a balanced agreement to limit the growth of nuclear arms. Only a balanced agreement will serve our interest and minimize the threat of nuclear confrontation.

1977:

I am proud that today America is at peace. None of our sons are fighting and dying in battle anywhere in the world. And the chance for peace among all nations is improved by our determination to honor our vital commitments in the defense of peace and freedom.

I am proud that the United States has strong defenses, strong alliances and a sound and courageous foreign policy.

Our alliances with our major partners, the great industrial democracies of Western Europe, Japan, and Canada, have never been more solid. Consultations on mutual security, defense and East-West relations have grown closer. Collaboration has branched out into new fields, such as energy, economic policy and relations with the Third World.

We have used many avenues for cooperation, including summit meetings held among major allied countries. The friendship of the democracies is deeper, warmer and more effective than at any time in 30 years.

We are maintaining stability in the strategic nuclear balance, and pushing back the spectre of nuclear war. A decisive step forward was taken in the Vladivostok Accord which I negotiated with General Secretary Brezhnev -- joint recognition that an equal ceiling should be placed on the number of strategic weapons on each side.

With resolve and wisdom on the part of both nations, a good agreement is well within reach this year.

The framework for peace in the Middle East has been built. Hopes for future progress in the Middle East were stirred by the historic agreements we reached and the trust and confidence we formed.

Thanks to American leadership, the prospects for peace in the Middle East are brighter than they have been in three decades. The Arab states and Israel continue to look to us to lead them from confrontation and war to a new era of accommodation and peace. We have no alternative but to persevere and I'm sure we will. The opportunities for a final settlement are great, and the price of failure is a return to the bloodshed and hatred that for too long have brought tragedy to all the peoples of this area, and repeatedly edged the world to the brink of war.

Our relationship with the People's Republic of China is proving its importance and its durability. We are finding more and more common ground between our two countries on basic questions of international affairs.

In my two trips to Asia as President, we have reaffirmed America's continuing vital interest in the peace and security of Asia and the Pacific Basin, established a new partnership with Japan, confirmed our dedication to the security of Korea, and reinforced our ties with the free nations of Southeast Asia.

An historic dialogue has begun between industrial nations and the developing nations. Most proposals on the table are the initiatives of the United States, including those on food, energy, technology, trade, investment and commodities. We are well launched on this process of shaping positive and reliable economic relations between rich nations and poor nations over the long term.

American leadership has helped to stimulate new international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to shape a comprehensive treaty governing the use of the oceans.

What has been achieved in the field of foreign affairs, and what can be accomplished by the new administration, demonstrate the genius of Americans working together for the common good. It is this, our remarkable ability to work together that has made us a unique nation. It is Congress, the President, and the people striving for a better world.

I know all patriotic Americans want the Nation's foreign policy to succeed.

I urge members of my party in the Congress to give the new President loyal support in this area.

In past years, as a result of decisions by the United States, our strategic forces levelled off. Yet the Soviet Union continued a steady, constant buildup of its own forces, committing a high percentage of its national economic effort to defense.

The United States can never tolerate a shift in the strategic balance against us, or even a situation where the American people or our allies believe the balance is shifting against us. The United States would risk the most serious political consequences if the world came to believe that our adversaries have a decisive margin of superiority. To maintain a strategic balance we must look ahead to the

1980s and beyond. The sophistication of modern weapons requires that we make decisions now if we are to ensure our security ten years from now.

In an era where the strategic nuclear forces are in rough equilibrium, the risks of conflict below the nuclear threshold may grow more perilous. A major long-term objective, therefore, is to maintain capabilities to deal with, and thereby deter, conventional challenges and crises, particularly in Europe.

1978:

During the past year, the United States restored our traditional friends and allies to the center of our foreign policy. Within days after his inauguration, the Vice President visited Brussels, Rome, Bonn, Paris, Reykjavik, and Tokyo. I met frequently in Washington with European and Japanese leaders. I participated in the Economic Summit in London, the 1977 NATO summit, and a Four Power Summit with leaders of Britain, Germany, and France. At the beginning of 1978, I visited France and Belgium -- and which in Brussels, made the first visit by an American President to the headquarters of the European Community. We have also consulted with our European Allies on such diverse subjects as SALT, MBFR, the Middle East, Africa, human rights, the Belgrade Conference, energy, non-proliferation, the global economy, and North-South relations. We will intensify these efforts this year, expanding the list to include close consultations with the Allies on major arms control issues.

On May 30-31, we will host a NATO Summit in Washington, and we are also planning another Economic Summit this year.

We have shown in our dealings with Japan that close allies can find solutions to shared problems. Early in the year, we were concerned about nuclear reprocessing in Japan, but through flexibility and goodwill on both sides a suitable accommodation was reached on the building of a nuclear reprocessing plant there. Most recently, we reached agreement with the Japanese on ways to deal with their large current account surplus. Our trade and economic talks are another example of constructive action.

1979:

In our relations with our potential adversaries it is a myth that we must choose between confrontation and capitulation. Together, we build the foundation for a stable world of both diversity and peace.

We are building that new foundation from a position of national strength -- the strength of our own defenses, of our friendship with other nations, and of our oldest ideals. America's military power is a major force for security and stability in the world. We must maintain our strategic capability and continue the progress of the last two years

with our NATO allies, with whom we have increased our readiness, modernized our equipment, and strengthened our defense forces in Europe. I urge you to support the strong Defense budget I have proposed.

But our national security in this complicated age requires more than military might. In less than a lifetime, world population has doubled; colonial empires have disappeared, and a hundred new nations have been born. Mass communications, literacy, and migration to the world's cities have all awakened new yearnings for economic justice and human rights among people everywhere. This demand for justice and human rights is the wave of the future.

In such a world, we seek not to stifle inevitable change, but to influence its course in helpful and constructive ways that enhance our values, our national interests, and the cause of peace.

Towering over all this volatile changing world, like a thundercloud on a summer day, looms the awesome power of nuclear weapons.

We will continue to help shape the forces of change; to anticipate emerging problems of nuclear proliferation and of conventional arms sales; and to use our great strength and influence to settle international conflicts in other parts of the world before they erupt and spread.

We have no desire to be the world's policeman. America does want to be the world's peacemaker.

1980:

At this time in Iran 50 Americans are still held captive, innocent victims of terrorism and anarchy.

Also at this moment, massive Soviet troops are attempting to subjugate the fiercely independent and deeply religious people of Afghanistan.

These two acts -- one of international terrorism and one of military aggression -- present a serious challenge to the United States of America and indeed to all the nations of the world. Together, we will meet these threats to peace.

In response to the abhorrent act in Iran, our nation has never been aroused and unified so greatly in peacetime. Our position is clear. The United States will not yield to blackmail.

But now we face a broader and more fundamental challenge in this region because of the recent military action of the Soviet Union.

Now, as during the last 3-1/2 decades, the relationship between our country, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union is the most critical in determining whether the world will live in peace or be engulfed in global conflict.

Since the end of the Second World War, America has led other nations in meeting the challenge of mounting soviet power. This has not been a simple or a static relationship.



Between us there has been cooperation, there has been competition, and at times there has been confrontation. In the 1940s we took the lead in creating the Atlantic Alliance in response to the Soviet Union's suppression and then consolidation of its East European empire and the resulting threat of the Warsaw Pact to Western Europe.

In the 1950s, we helped to contain further Soviet challenges in Korea, and in the Middle East, and we rearmed to assure the continuation of that containment.

In the 1960s, we met the Soviet challenge in Berlin, and we faced the Cuban missile crisis, and we sought to engage the Soviet Union in the important task of moving beyond the cold war and away from confrontation.

And in the 1970s, three American Presidents negotiated with the Soviet leaders in an attempt to halt the growth of the nuclear arms race. We sought to establish rules of behavior that would reduce the risks of conflict, and we searched for areas of cooperation that could make our relations reciprocal and productive, not only for the sake of our two nations, but for the security and peace of the entire world.

1981:

Over the past 48 months, clear progress has been made in solving the challenges we found in January of 1977:

Reversing previous trends, real defense spending has increased every year since 1977; the real increase in FY 1980 defense spending is well above 3 percent and I expect FY 81 defense spending to be even higher; looking ahead, the defense program I am proposing is premised on a real increase in defense spending over the next five years of 20 percent or more.

The NATO Alliance has proven its unity in responding to the situations in Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia and in agreeing on the issues to be addressed in the review of the Helsinki Final Act currently underway in Madrid.

We have continued this Nation's strong commitment to the pursuit of human rights throughout the world, evenhandedly and objectively; our commitment to a world-wide human rights policy has remained firm; and many other countries have given high priority to it.

Our resolve to oppose aggression, such as the illegal invasion by the Soviet Union into Afghanistan, has been supported by tough action.

1982:

Toward those who would export terrorism and subversion in the Caribbean and elsewhere, especially Cuba and Libya, we will act with firmness.

Our foreign policy is a policy of strength, fairness and balance. By restoring America's military credibility,

by pursuing peace at the negotiating table wherever both sides are willing to sit down in good faith, and by regaining the respect of America's allies and adversaries alike, we have strengthened our country's position as a force for peace and progress in the world.

1983:

America's foreign policy is once again based on bipartisanship -- on realism, strength, full partnership and consultation with our allies, and constructive negotiation with potential adversaries. From the Middle East to Southern Africa to Geneva, American diplomats are taking the initiative to make peace and lower arms levels. We should be proud of our role as peace-makers.

At the heart of our strategy for peace is our relationship with the Soviet Union.

The past year saw a change in Soviet leadership. We are prepared for a positive change in Soviet-American relations. But the Soviet Union must show, by deeds as well as words, a sincere commitment to respect the rights and sovereignty of the family of nations. Responsible members of the world community do not threaten or invade their neighbors and they restrain their allies from aggression.

For our part, we are vigorously pursuing arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union. Supported by our allies, we put forward draft agreements proposing significant weapons reductions to equal and verifiable lower levels. We insist on an equal balance of forces. and given the overwhelming evidence of Soviet violations of international treaties concerning chemical and biological weapons, we also insist that any agreement we sign can and will be verifiable.

In the case of intermediate range nuclear forces, we have proposed the complete elimination of the entire class of land based missiles. We are also prepared to carefully explore serious Soviet proposals. At the same time, let me emphasize that allied steadfastness remains a key to achieving arms reductions.

With firmness and dedication. we will continue to negotiate. Deep down, the Soviets must know it is in their interests as well as ours to prevent a wasteful arms race. And once they recognize our unshakable resolve to maintain adequate deterrence, they will have every reason to join us in the search for greater security and major arms reductions. When that moment comes -- and I am confident that it will -- we will have taken an important step toward a more peaceful future for all the world's people.

1984:

A lasting and meaningful peace is our fourth great goal. It is our highest aspiration. And our record is

clear: Americans resort to force only when we must. We have always struggled to defend freedom and democracy.

We have no territorial ambitions. We occupy no countries. We build no walls to lock people in. Americans build the future. And our vision of a better life for farmers, merchants, and working people, from the Americas to Asia, begins with a simple premise: The future is best decided by ballots, not bullets.

Together, we can continue to advance our agenda for peace. We can:

Establish a more stable basis for peaceful relations with the Soviet Union;

Strengthen allied relationships across the board;

Achieve real and equitable reductions in the levels of nuclear arms;

Reinforce our peacemaking efforts in the Middle East, Central America, and Southern Africa;

Assist developing countries, particularly our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere and

Assist in the development of democratic institutions throughout the world.

Tonight I want to speak to the people of the Soviet Union to tell them: It is true that our governments have had serious differences. But our sons and daughters have never fought each other in war. And if we Americans have our way, they never will.

People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy, for your country and mine, to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?

People of the Soviet: President Dwight Eisenhower, who fought by your side in World War II, said the essential struggle "is not merely man against man or nation against nation. It is man against war."

Americans are people of peace. If your government wants peace, there will be peace. We can come together in faith and friendship to build a safer and far better world for our children and our children's children. And the whole world will rejoice. That is my message to you.

1985:

Just as we are positioned as never before to secure justice in our economy, we are poised as never before to create a safer, freer, more peaceful world.

Our alliances are stronger than ever. Our economy is stronger than ever. We have resumed our historic role as a leader of the free world -- and all of these together are a great force for peace.

Since 1981 we have been committed to seeking fair and verifiable arms agreements that would lower the risk of war and reduce the size of nuclear arsenals. Now our determination to maintain a strong defense has influenced the Soviet Union to return to the bargaining table. Our negotiators must be able to go to that table with the united support of the American people. All of us have no greater dream than to see the day when nuclear weapons are banned from this Earth forever.

Each Member of the Congress has a role to play in modernizing our defenses, thus supporting our chances for a meaningful arms agreement. Your vote this spring on the Peacekeeper missile will be a critical test of our resolve to maintain the strength we need and move toward mutual and verifiable arms reductions.

For the past 20 years we have believed that no war will be launched as long as each side knows it can retaliate with a deadly counterstrike. Well, I believe there is a better way of eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

It is a Strategic Defense Initiative aimed ultimately at finding a non nuclear defense against ballistic missiles. It is the most hopeful possibility of the nuclear age. But it is not well understood.

Some say it will bring war to the heavens -- but its purpose is to deter war, in the heavens and on Earth. Some say the research would be expensive. Perhaps, but it could save millions of lives, indeed humanity itself. Some say if we build such a system the Soviets will build a defense system of their own. Well, they already have strategic defenses that surpass ours; a civil defense system, where we have almost none; and a research program covering roughly the same areas of technology we are exploring. And finally, some say the research will take a long time. The answer to that is: "Let's get started."

1986:

Let us speak of our deepest longing for the future -- to leave our children a land that is free and just and a world at peace. It is my hope that our fireside summit in Geneva and Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to America can lead to a more stable relationship. Surely no people on Earth hate war more or love peace more than we Americans.

But we cannot stroll into the future with childlike faith. Our differences with a system that openly proclaims and practices an alleged right to command people's lives and to export its ideology by force are deep and abiding.

Logic and history compel us to accept that our relationship be guided by realism -- rock-hard, cleareyed, steady, and sure. Our negotiators in Geneva have proposed a radical cut in offensive forces by each side, with no cheating. They have made clear that Soviet compliance with the letter and spirit of agreements is essential. If the

Soviet government wants an agreement that truly reduces nuclear arms, there will be an agreement.

But arms control is no substitute for peace. We know that peace follows in freedoms's path and conflicts erupt when the will of the people is denied. So we must prepare for peace no only by reducing weapons but by bolstering prosperity, liberty, and democracy however and wherever we can.

1987:

Since 1970, the Soviets have invested \$500 billion more on their military forces than we have. Even today, though nearly one in three Soviet families is without running hot water, and the average family spends two hours a day shopping for the basic necessities of life, their government still found the resources to transfer \$75 billion in weapons to client states in the past five years -- clients like Syria, Vietnam, cuba, Libya, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.

With 120,000 Soviet combat and military personnel and 15,000 military advisers in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, can anyone still doubt their single-minded determination to expand their power? Despite this, the Congress cut my request for critical U.S. security assistance to free nations by 21 percent this year, and cut defense request by \$85 billion in the last three years.

These assistance programs serve our national interests as well as mutual interests, and when the programs are devastated, American interests are harmed. My friends, it's my duty as President to say to you again tonight that there is no surer way to lose freedom than to lose our resolve.

1988:

Yet, even as we work to expand world freedom, we must build a safer peace and reduce the danger of nuclear war. But let's have not illusions. three years of steady decline in the value of our annual defense investment have increased the risk of our most basic security interests, jeopardizing earlier hard-won goals. We must face squarely the implications of this negative trend and make adequate, stable defense spending a top goal both this year and in the future. This same concern applies to economic and security assistance programs as well. But the resolve of America and its NATO allies has opened the way for unprecedented achievement in arms reduction. Our recently signed INF (Intermediate-range nuclear-force missiles) Treaty is historic because it reduces nuclear arms and establishes the most stringent verification regime in arms control history, including several forms of short notice, on site inspection. I submitted the treaty today, and I urge the Senate to give

its advice and consent to ratification of this landmark agreement. Thank you very much.

In addition to the INF Treaty, we're within reach of an even more significant START (strategic arms reduction talks) agreement that will reduce U.S. and Soviet long-range missile or strategic arsenals by half. But let me be clear -- our approach is not to seek agreement for agreement's sake, but to settle only for agreements that truly enhance our national security and that of our allies. We will never put our security at risk -- or that of our allies -- just to reach an agreement with the Soviets. No agreement is better than a bad agreement.

1989:

Great nations of the world are moving toward democracy -- through the door to freedom.

We know what works: Freedom works. We know what's right: Freedom is right. We know how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on earth: through free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will unhampered by the state.

While keeping our alliances and friendships around the world strong, ever strong, we will continue the new closeness with the Soviet Union, consistent both with our security and with progress. One might say that our new relationship in part reflects the triumph of hope and strength and experience. but hope is good. and so is strength. And so is peace.

1990:

It's no secret that here at home freedom's door opened long ago. The cornerstones of this free society have already been set in place: democracy, competition, opportunity, private investment, stewardship, and of course leadership. And our challenge today is to take this democratic system of ours, a system second to none, and make it better.

There is a new world of challenges and opportunities before us, and there's a need for leadership that only America can provide. Nearly 40 years ago, in his last address to the Congress, President Harry Truman predicted such a time would come. He said: "As our world grows stronger, more united, more attractive to men on both sides of the Iron Curtain, then inevitably there will come a time of change within the Communist world." Today, that change is taking place.

For more than 40 years, America and its allies held communism in check and ensured that democracy would continue to exist. And today, with communism crumbling, our aim must be to ensure democracy's advance, to take the lead in forging peace and freedom's best hope: a great and growing

commonwealth of free nations. And to the Congress and to all Americans, I say it is time to acclaim a new consensus at home and abroad, a common vision of the peaceful world we want to see.

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Captain Lois J. Schloz was born on 14 August 1958 in Fairfield, California. She graduated from John F. Kennedy High School in Barstow, California in 1976, and attended Barstow Community College, graduating with an Associate of Arts in Social Sciences. From there she transferred to California State University at Fullerton, where she obtained a Bachelor of Arts in Sociology and her elementary school education certification. She taught third and fourth grade for five years in Hinkley, California before attending Officer Training School at Lackland AFB in 1985. She served her first tour of duty at the 3246th Test Wing at Eglin AFB, Florida. She began as a Munitions Supply Officer, where she was accountable for 1500 munitions line items used to support research and development of new munitions items. Her next assignment was as Officer in Charge of the Munitions Storage Area, where she was responsible for the storage, build up, delivery, inspection and inventory of the 1500 line item account. She was then selected to head a flight line branch, where she was responsible for the organization level maintenance of four different types of aircraft, including F-4s, A-10s, T-38s and F-111s. She served there until entering the School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology in May 1990.

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  STRATEGIC DEFENSE: SHOULD THE AIR FORCE CHANGE ITS DOCTRINE?			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This study set out to determine if the United States Air Force strategic defense doctrine requires changing. The researcher applied contextual content analysis to selected foreign policy statements taken from Presidential State of the Union addresses to determine if past doctrine and strategy changes were evidenced by the context and emphasis scores generated by the Minnesota Contextual Content Analysis (MCCA) software package used for this study. Use of the student's t-test showed differences in mean scores between the years with no strategy or doctrinal changes and those in which such changes are documented. These differences in means indicate changes in attitude, which strongly affect doctrine and strategy determination. After showing that these changes in scores related to documented changes in doctrine and strategy, the researcher looked at the scores from 1990 to determine if a change is once again in order. The scores for the year 1990 do indeed demonstrate a need to change the doctrine and strategy. The correlation in scores cannot, however, determine the specific changes that must be made.				
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